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ABSTRACT
China has been home to some of the most prominent hackers and hacker
groups of the global community throughout the last decade. In the last ten years,
countless attacks globally have been linked to the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) or those operating within the PRC. This exploration attempts to investigate
the story, ideology, institutions, actions, and motivations of the Chinese hackers
collectively, as sub-groups, and as individuals. I will do this using sources
ranging from basic news coverage, interviews with experts and industry veterans,
secondary reportage, leaked documents from government and private sources,
government white papers, legal codes, blogs and microblogs, a wide array of
materials from the darker corners of the online world, and many other materials.
The work will begin to sketch for the reader some of the general and specific
aspects of the shadowy world of cybercrime and hacker culture in China in recent
years. One of the most prevalent beliefs is that the Chinese government is in fact
the one responsible, whether directly or by sponsor, for cyber-attacks on foreign
systems. My careful analysis has revealed is not always the case, or at least
more complex than simply labeling the group as a state actor. At the root of these
attacks is a social movement of "hacktivists," a patriotic sub-culture of Chinese
hackers. It is incorrect to allege that all attacks are performed by state-sponsored
individuals or groups, because there are many individuals and groups that are
motivated by other factors.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an innovative frontier of cyber warfare that is rapidly expanding
all over the world, with billions of individuals now united by the internet. Due to
the greater opportunities to acquire information, individuals are linked in a way
that has never been experienced before. Massive security concerns within online
systems are increasing and transforming on a daily basis due to the global
access to monetary and government systems, as well as information stored by
private institutions. These security issues parallel the creation and growth of a
global hacker culture. China has been home to some of the most prominent
hackers and hacker groups of the global community throughout the last decade.
In the last ten years, countless attacks globally have been linked to the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) or those operating within the PRC. According to the
2012 State of the Internet Report published by the Akamai group, an online
services provider, a third of all cyber-attacks that they were aware of have
originated in China in the third quarter of 2012.1 This report names China as the
biggest hacking entity and as the statistical home to the majority of cyber-attacks
among all countries.
In the last twenty years China has been in the midst of a type of internet
revolution as its peoples are seeking new ways to express themselves as they
are further exposed to the greater technology-based globe. Thanks to the
establishment of the internet and the liberties that are allowed to its users, the
hacking culture in China has grown and advanced in ways that are more dynamic
1
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and dramatic than any other nation. Although cyber-crimes in Russia, the United
States, and countries of the Middle East have garnered much attention over the
past few decades, Chinese hackers operate on a scale far greater and vastly
different than any other.

Statement of Purpose
This exploration attempts to investigate the story, ideology, institutions,
actions, and motivations of the Chinese hackers collectively, as sub-groups, and
as individuals. I will do this using sources ranging from basic news coverage,
interviews with experts and industry veterans, secondary reportage, leaked
documents from government and private sources, government white papers,
legal codes, blogs and microblogs, a wide array of materials from the darker
corners of the online world, and many other materials. I hope that the work will
begin to sketch for the reader some of the general and specific aspects of the
shadowy world of cybercrime and hacker culture in China in recent years.
In academic studies and the media, there is a developing fascination in
cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage. This includes a particular interest in Chinese
hackers infiltrating personal, corporate, and government webpages in a wide
variety of countries. One of the most prevalent beliefs is that the Chinese
government is in fact the one responsible, whether directly or by sponsor, for
cyber-attacks on foreign systems. My careful analysis has revealed is not always
the case, or at least more complex than simply labeling the group as a state
actor. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has indeed established one of the
2

most advanced cyber-capabilities apart from Russia, Iran, and the United States.
In some accusations, it is suspected that Chinese authorities are simply
intentionally ignoring unlawful behaviors that further the country’s economic
goals, or which strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) agenda.
Yet, there is something truly extraordinary taking place in China that many
media outlets tend to gloss over. Hidden at the root of these attacks is a social
movement of "hacktivists," a patriotic sub-culture of Chinese hackers. It is too
simple and incorrect to allege that all attacks are performed by state-sponsored
individuals or groups, because there are many individuals and groups that are
motivated by other factors. There are individuals who perform these actions
outside of the influence of the government, and there are many distinct
motivations involved. This complexity is generally not found in much news
coverage and analysis related to the field of global cyber warfare, but this
landscape is indeed complex and worth further exploration. In my research, I
have found that there are underlying factors related to Chinese cultural identity,
nationalism, individual status, and a hacker’s personal reputation that can be
hidden within the context of this cyber-war.
Recently, there has been a push within China to restore some traditional
forms of identity. Today, both Confucianism and Maoism are being revived in
China. Whether it is a return to Confucian beliefs, or merely reverting the
Communist Party back towards Maoist beliefs, there is indeed cultural change
happening. The cultural landscape of China continues to radically transform and
shift, even as it did throughout most of the twentieth century. The post-Mao era
3

has brought not slowing to the cultural changes and the constant reinvention of
Chinese identity, and these changes certainly affect China’s hacker culture.
Within the cyber-attacks that originate in China sometimes there are patriotic
motivations even if the group is not employed or directed by the state. There is
an attempt to preserve an essential or idealized Chinese identity in the midst of a
barrage of foreign ideas and products. Sometimes this is Confucian China that is
considered to be under attack by patriotic Chinese people, sometimes it is
Marxism and Maoism, and sometimes it is China’s sovereign claims to its
borders at sea and on land. Interestingly, within these attacks by hackers there
can be seen a kind of homegrown effort to enhance or protect Chinese identity
and interest. This is a new generation, and it is one that is perhaps less troubled
than those before it by painful past events like the Cultural Revolution or
Tiananmen Square. These events profoundly alienated and embittered activists
and intellectuals, many of whom were silenced, or reluctantly chose silence, or
emigrated at their first opportunity. While this new generation of potential activists
has grown with perhaps some awareness of these events, online forums and
new media have given new intellectuals and activists ways to organize and
express themselves that individuals in these earlier eras could not. These
platforms, while the state tries to control them in certain ways, still can potentially
give voice to patriotism, protest, and frustration of all kinds as articulations of
cultural identity, and that cultural continues to be in flux.
The topic of cybercrime and cyberwarfare are extraordinarily important
elements in the constantly innovating technical landscape where cyberspace
4

converges with an individual’s more essential daily facets. The occurrence of
hacking is a result of the advancement in online networking tools like the Internet.
Cyber-espionage has the potential to affect everything from entertainment to
financial transactions, social networking, education, and countless other aspects
of our lives. In fact, many online systems that comprise of today’s global
community, including health-care organizations, fiscal systems, and confidential
military systems can be potentially destroyed or looted by hackers. From highprofile and far-reaching banking hacks, to the titanic leaks and hacks connected
to Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, and the organizations Ashley Madison
and Mossack Fonseca, the world is becoming increasingly aware that the risk to
our confidential information seems to be growing. It impacts people, and it harms
international organizations. Besides the most prominent global hacks noted
immediately above, Chinese hackers continue to work at an astounding scale.
One Chinese group alone, APT1, has methodically stolen hundreds of terabytes
of information from at least one hundred and forty one organizations, and has
proven that it has the competence and the intention to pilfer from dozens of
organizations at the same time.2 Hacking activities have led to the loss of billions
of dollars worldwide, whether directly and incidentally.
Due to this, the subject of cyber-crime is a hotly deliberated topic by both
media and security groups. According to Dmitri Alperovitch, vice president of
threat research for the cybersecurity specialists, McAfee Securities, “Today we
see pretty much any company that has valuable intellectual property or trade
2
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secrets of any kind being pilfered continually, all day long, every day,
relentlessly.”3 It is the pilfering of items like trade secrets and patents that has
cost American companies substantial income and has regularly led to the loss of
employment opportunities. In an interview that I performed with the Vice
President of Cyber Security at Masergy, David Venable, “Chinese cyber efforts
have typically been around stealing intellectual property for business. This could
be both government backed, or financed independently. But again, sometimes
the same individuals will do work for both, so there can be overlap.” 4 Estimates of
job losses due to cybercrime could be as high as 200,000 American jobs, and as
many as 150,000 jobs in Europe.5 The Chief of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, James Comey, has gone on record stating that the yearly costs to
American businesses are “impossible to count,” however, extend well into the
billions.6 These losses are a result of lost exclusive markets, lost
competitiveness, and other factors as industry secrets are stolen and used by
competitors.
From Washington’s perspective, Cybersecurity and espionage like this
constitutes a topic that the People’s Republic of China has commonly avoided or
denied. Yet potentially, it has the ability to drastically influence impending
political, economic, and military dealings between the U.S. and China. The
3
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debate surrounding theft of intellectual property will become vastly more
significant as modern societies becomes progressively more technological, and a
desire to understand and curb hacking even while hacker groups often defy law
enforcement and even identification.
Within the Chinese hacking world there is an ever-changing mix of official,
military, and civilian groups. These groups are generally tough to differentiate
from each other. Due to this, accusations critical of the Chinese government are
common. Security organizations like Mandiant, FireEye, and Trend Micro (all of
which are used in this research), in addition to companies like Google have
regularly blamed Chinese hackers in the theft of intellectual property from all
aspects of society. This research attempt to show that this hacker culture that
should be better understood and might be of greatest importance among all of
China’s hacking groups moving forward, due to the range of motivations and
targets.
The issue that is the focal point of my research is unravelling the nature,
motivations, and classifications of Chinese hacker groups. The goal is to provide
the reader with an understanding of how cultural changes in Chinese identity
have allowed individuals the opportunity to explore and expand the landscape of
online activism, one dimension of which is hacking. Understanding the cultural
foundations of China’s hackers today has led me to explore the recent history of
the People’s Republic of China, and how Chinese identity has transformed so
fundamentally in the twentieth century, through the post-Mao era, and into the
twentieth century. I will attempt to provide a more detailed look into Chinese
7

hacker culture, because I feel like the greater story is the hackers themselves
instead of the Chinese government. Cyber-attacks by individuals out of China,
whether by state-sponsored actors, by independent nationalistic groups, or by
profit-seekers who are merely seeking the highest bidder for their services, has
turned global cyber-warfare into a severe international threat. Yet in my opinion,
the characteristically swift description of these collections by other governments,
organizations, and various news outlets is irresponsible and perhaps dangerous.
It is true that hackers in China are persistent, and their influence is undeniable.
Within the society there are hacker publications, hacker organizations, and online
hacker forums. Yet, Chinese hacker culture thrives on an internet driven
nationalism. Even the ”Red Hacker Alliance,” which is the most commonly known
and one of the oldest hacker groups in China, is just a loose association allowing
disparate cells who banded together for nationalistic and political purposes.
The purpose of my research is to distinguish, as clearly as possible,
between the various groups of Chinese hackers: state-sponsored, freelance, and
independent. There are inherent motivations that distinguish the groups. There is
also sometimes a very fine line that separates the government actors from the
patriotic actors, and sometimes that line can be blurred beyond discernibility for
the observer. In the course of my research, there are a few questions that I will
attempt to answer. Why are each of these groups doing engaged in these
activities? What are some of the common motivations for each, and how do they
differ from one another? How do independent hackers distinguish themselves
from their state-sponsored counterparts? How do independent hackers organize?
8

I hope to demonstrate that it is the disparate motivations to engage in
hacking and cyber espionage that most clearly distinguishes each group from
one another. The motivations behind independent hackers are very intriguing.
Some of the earliest and oldest groups are pro-China activists, but not
necessarily or not always pro-government activists. They merely have sought the
betterment of China through their activities. Some of the groups within this
category came about in response to various political issues in an attempt to push
a patriotic agenda. There are others who are fueled by financial gain, or merely
to enhance their reputation. There are many historical, political, and social
aspects that have not been fully explored in previous analyses, and I take on
these daunting and opaque questions directly, using a combination of published
and unpublished sources, interviews, and personal online investigation.
Along these same lines, there are other issues worth exploring such as
the question of how these motivations affect the actions of these groups. Statesponsored hackers have been known to attack different systems and have a
different type of victim than that of their patriotic, non-state-sponsored
counterparts. These different things have helped independent activists
distinguish themselves from the others, both in the nature of their work as well as
in how each group organizes. According to an interview I performed with a former
member of Anonymous Serbia, the motives, methods, and goals are what make
it possible to distinguish between independent and state-sponsored. He stated “I
believe that main method of distinguishing them is by the work they do.
Independent groups usually don't achieve a lot, as they are driven by emotion,
9

while state-sponsored hackers have a specific goal. So, usually I can distinguish
them just by looking at the results of their work.”7 I will explore these questions in
an attempt to expose the common misconceptions of cyberwarfare in China.
A central issue surrounding a hacker organization when attacks are
discovered, is what type of association, if there is one at all, the group might have
with any state administration or organization. Is it legitimately sponsored by the
government or is it employed as a proxy to implement the Chinese Communist
Party’s political agenda? The real question is whether there are two factions
operating within China, with the first being a collection of private citizens and the
other a division of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or individuals employed as
state agents? “Chinese hackers” have littered the media landscape, along with
theories about government involvement, along with the growing forms of cybercrimes they have perpetrated. According to an interview I performed with the
founder of HackRead, this misconception is what he believes is a significant
issues. He states “The Chinese are very sophisticated in their attacks but
accusing everything on them or the Russians sounds like a script of some
“Hollywood movie.””8 What is commonly omitted from most of this reportage and
scholarship is a clear background and explanation on just who comprises these
secretive organizations.
Despite the fact that research on Chinese hackers is relatively new owing
to the modern progress of individual and societal cyber-capabilities. There is
some significant work emerging, and the issues concerning cybercrime on a
7
8
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grander level have been explored from quite a few perspectives. The topic of
hacking and cyber-warfare is far older than that of hackers in China. For
example, the United Nations General Assembly implemented computer crime law
in 1990, which is a full four years before the internet was available in China. In
the mid-1990’s, nations began to form tactics and shared doctrines to fight
cybercrime and safeguard intellectual data, and in this study I will explore these
and other policies and laws in various countries. At the beginning of the twentyfirst century, numerous regulations and laws were established internationally by
the majority of countries throughout the international community. Countless
countries have created legislation with protection from, and prosecution of,
cybercrimes as the goal. Many researchers and academics had become
attracted to the fields of cybercrime, the internet, and cyberespionage as
information has become more easily accessible and the topics currency and
popularity has exploded in the public sphere.
There are many researchers who explore topics that are peripherally
related to my proposed field of research, and some who take on a similar topic
directly. The Dark Sides of the Internet: On Cyber Threats and Information
Warfare (Peter Lang GmbH, 2013), written by the individual in charge of cyberdefense research as well as the Deputy Research Director at the Swedish
Defense Research Agency, Roland Heickero, explores several areas related to
my field such as theft of data and information, cybercrime and cyber threats, and
the consequences of such actions. He explains the importance of the internet as
a means for greater freedoms for both criminal organizations and political
11

activists alike. Another work by Julie Mehan, Associate Professor at the
University of Maryland, titled CyberWar, CyberTerror, CyberCrime: A Guide to
the Role of Standards in an Environment of Change and Danger, (IT Governance
Publishing, 2008) attempts to create a greater awareness of changing threats in
the cyber landscape. These are just two of the many examples of broad scale
perspectives on the field of cybercrime that serve as a technical background to
my study of Chinese hackers. There are many other individuals like Heickero and
Mehan who provide this type of broad exploration of the topic of cybercrime.
The topic of Chinese cybercrime itself is less clearly defined or even
examined in academic circles. I have found that research on the subject of cybercapabilities in China are usually categorized in two ways: works on global
cyberwarfare that include sections on China, and works on the cyber-capabilities
of the Chinese military like Elisabette M. Marvel’s China’s Cyber Warfare
Capability. (Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010) Works such as these
provide valuable examinations of how China fits into the larger topic of global
cybersecurity, but they do not provide a look at the distinctive characteristics of
Chinese hacker groups themselves.
Other sources explore the phenomenon and rise of hackers in other
broader contexts. RAND Corporation researchers Martin Libicki, David Sentry
and Julia Pollack’s book H4acker5 Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity
Labor Market (Rand Corporation, 2014) examines the confrontation between
hackers and their targets from the perspective of a cybersecurity professional
with examinations into the economic and political factors, as well as the demand
12

for cybersecurity labor. Hacker Culture by Douglas Thomas, Associate Professor
at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern
California, (University of Minnesota Press, 2002), provides a look at the rise of
global hacker culture in the 1980s and 1990s. Like most sources on hackers,
these sources do not examine China and have become somewhat outdated at
the time of writing in spring 2016.
In my quest to find sources of research that is unique from the rest of the
field, I also incorporate non-fiction sources as well. In 2015, P.W. Singer and
August Cole published the novel Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War,
which discusses the future of the very topic that my research incorporates:
Chinese cyberwarfare. This type of source adds more diversity, and even though
it is a work of fiction it is surrounded with well-informed and accurate information.
The two authors worked very hard to provide a strong and accurate portrayal of
how the next World War would play out between the United States and China,
and the narrative is surrounded by actual developments and technology. Some of
the projections of the authors have already come true, which shows the true
strength of the research behind the novel.
Probably the most relevant source to this study comes from Scott
Henderson, and author who spent over twenty years as a mandarin linguist for
various intelligence organizations, titled The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of
Chinese Hackers.(self-published, 2007). Henderson’s work is one of the more
significant sources that is devoted entirely to Chinese hackers and Chinese
cybercrime. Other sources examine Chinese hackers as a whole, and the
13

damage that they are doing with each attack. It is perhaps telling that this work is
self-published and has seems to have enjoyed a relatively small readership in
spite of this subject being so crucial to geopolitics. The individuals and groups
Henderson explores are motivated primarily by patriotism and nationalism, which
looks at the motivations and differences within the Chinese hacker community.
There are several things that set my proposed research apart from Henderson.
His work is outdated, and my analysis can incorporate close to a decade of
further evaluation. He also only deals with independent patriotic hackers, and not
state-sponsored groups.

Methodologies
Beginning this project I realized that it was a daunting task to distinguish
thousands of Chinese hackers whose motive might include those of the vigilante,
the hobbyist, the state actor, the professional for hire, or a blending of these
groups. While some hackers may move from one group to another within their
career, or even may span more than one simple category in a single days
activity, I have aimed to distinguish the categories, at least, in a way that
separates their motivations, styles, and gives a background to why they exist in
the forms that they do. This study uses a qualitative approach in an attempt to
gain an understanding of underlying reasons, motivations, and insights to access
the intricacies of Chinese cyber-attacks and the individuals or groups that carry
them out.

14

Due to the controversial and contentious nature of the subject, I have
attempted to provide the research with as neutral a stance as possible in an
attempt to provide a valuable window onto these groups that goes deeper than
hasty news coverage or biased and incomplete government statements. Both
news reports and official statements factor in this study, but I have also
incorporated interviews with experts and former hackers, as well as the various
new media outlets like blogs and microblogs that are usually the most current
and cogent analysis of the latest developments in the Chinese political and social
landscape. Sites like China Digital Times and The China Media Project, for
example, include both traditional news reporting, and more urgent and current
formats like blogs by leading experts and news aggregation from many varied
outlets in China and around the world.
These various forms of research were chosen in order to provide
personal, group, national, and global perspectives on cyber-attacks emanating
from China. Information was also chosen with special attention paid to the validity
of the source. Government response and publications, as well as statisticaldriven reports by cyber-security organizations are shown to be extremely valid
and important to the research. Personal accounts are used to strengthen these
other forms of research.
Due to the qualitative approach of the research, I attempted to establish
as much focused information collection as possible. The methods of data
collection come in the form of existing surveys, questionnaires, government
publications, interviews, and secondary research. These existing forms of
15

information are taken from cyber-security experts and professional organizations
with strong insights into global cyber-attacks. Government publications are taken
from existing US, Chinese, and UN documents with careful analysis and
consideration, in an attempt to provide an overall neutral perspective of the
discourse on this subject.
Examples of surveys in sampling include the Center for Social
Development Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ “Surveying Internet Usage
and its Impact in Seven Chinese Cities.” An example of an existing interview
includes China Educational Television’s interview of Sharp Winner, HackRead’s
interview of 7zi, and Time Magazine’s interview of Wan Tao. All of these
individuals and sources will be thoroughly explained below. This study explores
the nascent world of existing cyber-crime legislation both at a national level as
well as an international level in an attempt to hypothesize the scope, awareness,
and possible futures of cyber-attacks and cyber-warfare. Government
publications used in this sampling include the UN’s Convention on Cybercrime,
or the European Commission’s Report from the Commission: First Report on the
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive, and more importantly the PLA’s
The Science of Military Strategy.
Also included are new interviews with cyber-security experts and
individuals within the hacking world. I conducted these new interviews mainly
through digital communications as opposed to phone, which allowed the
interview . This new information provides new insights, never before published,
on the topics of hacking, cyber-attacks, and the Chinese hacking community.
16

Individuals were specially chosen based on their previous work and research,
which established their authority on the subject. Their work and research are
specific to Chinese cyber-attacks, Chinese hackers, or a related field. The
interview subjects include a Bosnian journalist who spent significant time working
with the hacking group Anonymous Serbia, the founder of HackRead who himself
is an expert in the field, and the Vice President of Cyber Security with the
organization Masergy. I questioned them on topics pertaining directly to their
field, whether that be cyber-attacks, the role of government in perpetrating these
attacks, or the types of tools used in common attacks.
This research constitutes both original research into primary resources,
government documents, blogs, news reports and others, as well as being an
aggregation of many deeply biased primary and secondary sources, taking them
each at face value and evaluating their veracity and value. Many previous
analyses of Chinese cyber-crime have been agenda-driven works that aim to
assign guilt, often in a hasty way, most notably linking all Chinese cybercrime to
the Chinese state.

Goal of Research
The goal of the research was to provide a deeper and more even-handed
representation of the Chinese hacking world in recent years, to understand the
historical roots and antecedents of the movement, and to cut through the
propaganda and disingenuous characterizations from nearly all of the loudest
voices in this world. The broadest conclusion of this research has been to
17

delineate various groups in the Chinese hacking world into the categories of
independent, state-sponsored, and freelance. The findings of this study indicate
that there are distinct differences between the three categories of Chinese
hackers, and that these groups have fundamentally differing motivations and
goals. I have found that it is possible to distinguish independent actors and statesponsored groups through the evaluation of targets of attack, types of attack, and
means of attack. This study has found that cyber-crime motivations, perpetration,
and tools are predictive based on group motivations and trends. The research
and information is analyzed from several perspectives (US, China, and each of
the three categories of hacker) in order to keep the unbiased nature of the
findings intact, but also to provide a top-down and bottom-up perspective of the
field.

Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations and challenges that had to be addressed and
overcome throughout the course of research accumulation, analysis, and writing.
The most significant was the language barrier between English and Chinese. In
order to overcome this, a variety of tools were used. Several native Chinese
speakers assisted in the project as translators and sometimes simple digital
translating tools were used to obtain a rough translations that was later refined
with the help of native speakers. Also, news outlets like China Digital Times,
China Media Project, The People’s Daily, Xinhua, and others consistently reprint
English translations of prominent Chinese news items. Another issue was that of
18

western- or US-bias in source material and the author’s background, which was
overcome through the use of statistic-driven research and careful analysis and
parsing of sources. The last issue included that of the secluded and anonymous
aspects of Chinese hacking culture, which made individual contact very difficult.
Pre-existing and published interviews, as well as a more global search for
interviews performed on my behalf, were employed. This provided both a
Chinese and a global outlook on the topic.
My proposed field of study also includes Chinese social movements, as
hacker groups are naturally founded and fueled by surrounding social and
political changes. This field is significantly larger. A few social movements and
cultural trends that are particularly relevant to Chinese hackers are the Chinese
democracy and activist movements throughout the 1990s, the recent netizen
movement (based on freedom of expression), the revivals of Confucianism and
Marxism, and Chinese nationalism and patriotism. While each of these have
entire fields of research themselves, my research will narrow down these
movements to linked motivations and effects that each movement had on China’s
hackers and hacker culture. There are several works in the field that can greatly
aid my research. Kevin O’Brien’s Popular Protest in China (Harvard University
Press, 2008) has chapters outlining student movements and contention in
cyberspace. In China’s Future: The Path to Prosperity and Peace (Enrich
Professional Publishing, 2013), Jim Canrong illustrates the changing ideologies
that underline Chinese culture. He describes and analyzes the cultural changes
over the last two decades, which sheds light on the background of Chinese social
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change. Works like these are essential in the understanding of the Chinese
individual and their choices to join hacker groups, which is what is missing today
from the field.
When one analyzes the research that others have done on the topic of
Chinese cybercrime and the culture of hackers within China, there is a single
resounding opinion that tends to be misleading. Much of the work published on
this subject points toward one category of actor as the root of all illegal actions:
the Chinese government or a subsidiary. In reality, the government is just one
piece of a very large puzzle. There are many organizations that support the claim
of government rooted activities, two of which include the Washington Times and
Mandiant Inc, both of whom have published articles or reports linking cyberattacks to the PLA. The Washington Times argues that there is a significant
correlation between the growth of Chinese cyber-intelligence and the attacks on
American corporations. In their article “China Investing in Cyberwarfare
Superiority,” Bill Geerts writes that “they [the Chinese government] have stolen
hundreds of billions of dollars of intellectual property from U.S. businesses and
continue to commit this theft. The Chinese have now increased their capability to
conduct massive attacks and continue to consider this weapon as a primary tool
in their arsenal.”9 This is a great example of western media biases, as
publications like the Washington Times have a propensity to attribute all cyberattacks that emanate from Asia to the Chinese government regardless of the
9

Gertz, Bill. "Cheers to Good Frenemies! China Investing in Cyberwarfare Superiority." The
Washington Times. April 1, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/1/china-invests-cyberwarfare-compete-usmilitary/?page=all

20

complexities of the Chinese hacking community.
Many media outlets, like the Washington Times for example, have a
tendency to fuel debate for sensational reasons, and global cybercrime is no
different. A simple story of the Chinese government running a nefarious and wellcoordinated ring of cybercriminals will perhaps draw in readers for whom this
story validates a worldview. In reality, the individuals responsible are not always
state-sponsored, but usually have a broad spectrum of motivations. One key
element that sets the Chinese hacker culture apart from the stereotypical western
hacker is the deep-rooted nationalism of so many Chinese hackers. This can be
seen throughout times of political conflict with other countries, as individuals and
hacker groups become especially active. This is an aspect that my preliminary
research has found is not commonly covered by the media and other academics.
There is support for the research, but finding work that gives a modern
collective view of the field is extremely difficult. One of the few academic texts
written on the subject of Chinese hackers and nationalism is Henderson’s The
Dark Visitor. It is one of the few and only books devoted exclusively to this topic.
Henderson’s text was published in 2007, and provides he no follow-up. This is
much the case with this field of study. Much of the information becomes outdated
quickly because motivations, the relevant technology, and the nature of attacks
change dramatically. This can be attributed to the growth and fluidity of the
subject base, as well as a language barrier for most western academics.
Since 2006, the spotlight has been increasingly focused on cyberattacks
and what some consider an escalating cyberwar. Research that links China to
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global attacks has an origin around this time. Some of the first information
published was on the Red Hacker Alliance which started as an online protest
movement by activists. The research for this study extends to our era, when
online activism in China first found its voice.
One of the most common counter-arguments emanating from Chinese
sources is that the United States is in fact the greatest perpetrator of cyberespionage and cyber-attacks. In an interview performed by myself with a former
member of Anonymous Serbia, the individual stated that “At this point, it's certain
that ALL governments, including USA and China, are using hackers in order to
gain an advantage over other countries. This goes not only in intelligence
gathering but probably often as part of the effort to destabilise the economy of
others.”10 The most significant agencies within the U.S. are the FBI, the NSA,
and the CIA. The United States has multiple agencies that have internet-based
resources and cyber capabilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) runs
an Internet surveillance program called Carnivore that allows U.S. officials the
ability to intercept and collect electronic communications. The National Security
Agency (NSA) was established in 1952 to act as a focal point for Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Security (COMSEC), with subdivisions in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence
(ELINT).11 Communications signals are collected by the NSA around the world,
processes, and if deemed necessary, are given to other agencies like the CIA
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and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency).
One of the most proligic government agencies with cyber capabilities in
the NSA. Director of the NSA, General Lew Allen, gave a public overview of the
responsibilities of the NSA as “directing foreign intelligence, obtained from
foreign electrical communications… foreign intelligence derived from these
signals is then reported to various agencies of the government in response to
their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.”12 The agency itself is not
devoted entirely to cyber-warfare, but it does have sub-divisions that have
mastered the cyber-landscape. The TAO unit (Tailored Access Operations) is
one of these groups, and is commonly deployed for specific targets, to hack
difficult systems, tap cellular phone networks, or to implant surveillance
devices.13 The NSA has another similar group called the Red Team. Its main
component was probing for vulnerabilities in new hardware and software that had
been designed for the Defense Department. The People Daily published an
article in response to the cyber-capabilities of the American government and
military in which it is proclaimed that:
Western hostile forces… use the network, and relying on computers,
mobile phones and other such information terminals, maliciously attack
our Party, … arouse mistaken thinking trends of historical nihilism, with the
ultimate goal of using “universal values” to mislead us, using
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“constitutional democracy” to throw us into turmoil, use “colour revolutions”
to overthrow us, use negative public opinion and rumours to oppose us,
and use “de-partification and depoliticization of the military” to upset us.14
Outside the United States, countries like Russia and Iran also dominate
the cyber-landscape. While Russia’s cyber-capabilities are far behind the United
States, they are a trailblazer in the area of cyberwarfare. In 1999, the Russian
nation-state was charged with hacking the American military network in what is
now known as Moonlight Maze. Kevin Mandia, who later went on to start the
security company Mandiant, was sent by the American government to interview
individuals in Moscow. While there he concluded that “the Russian government
had been the hacker, working through servers of the academy of sciences.”15
While in Russia, political hackers strongly showed their skill in assaulting and
immobilizing the communication of Estonia in 2007, as well as in Georgia in
2008. During a time of armed conflict in 2008, at the precise moment when tanks
and planes crossed the South Ossetian Line, fifty-four Georgian websitesrelated to mass media, finance, government ministries, police, and armed forceswere hacked and, along with the nation’s entire internet service rerouted to
Russian servers, which shut them down.16 Speaking to student cadets in
September 2010 in Orebburg, the Russian president bluntly stated, “the
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computer today is now no less important of a weapon than an automatic weapon
or a tank.”17
Iranian hackers have also shown significant hacking talent. Google CEP
Eric Schmidt indicated that "Iranians are unusually talented in cyber war for some
reason we don’t fully understand".18 Iran is now considered an emerging military
power in the field. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that Iran has
“undertaken a concerted effort to use cyberspace to its advantage”.19 Iran
was reported in 2013 to have hacked U.S. Navy computers, in one of the most
serious infiltrations from the Middle East to date.20
Outside of state hacking groups, there has been a rise in independent
hacking groups. Anonymous, by far, is the most well-known hacktivist association
worldwide. The various individuals that make up the group Anonymous are
unified by the conviction that organizations and administrations they deem
corrupt should be confronted or even assaulted.21 One example of this is the
2010 campaign “Operation: Payback” (as seen below), which saw the
Anonymous group attack MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) and
RIAA (Recording Industry of America) in retaliation for their attacks on the torrent
site ThePirateBay. The group its roots from the online image-based bulletin
board 4chan, which started in 2003. The title "Anonymous" was inspired by the
“Speech at opening of the first Presidential Cadet Academy,” September 1, 2010,
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transctipts/865.
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perceived anonymity in which users were able to communicate and post on
4chan.22

Figure 1: Anonymous Video Screenshot and Logo. The logo commonly
associated with the hacking group Anonymous.23 The second picture is a
screenshot of one of Anonymous’ videos after an ISIS attack on Brussels. 24
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Figure 2: Operation Payback Message. The post left by the hacktivist group
Anonymous following attacks on the MPAA and the RIAA in retaliation for their
actions on the site ThePirateBay.25
25
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CHAPTER ONE
SHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS
The cultural identity of China has been in a state of flux and even chaos
throughout the twentieth century. From the fall of imperial China in 1911, through
the warlord era and the Japanese invasion, civil war, Communist victory, famine
and the Cultural Revolution, the political changes in China have had a profound
impact on the cultural identity of the diverse population of the PRC. Over the last
few decades, since the death of Chinese Communist Party Chairman, Mao
Zedong in 1976, the identities and cultures of China have shown no sign of
slowing their relentless transformation and reinvention. Social movements have
helped create and define new forms of Chinese identity. Movements like the
democracy and activist movements throughout the 1980s, the Chinese netizen
movements, the revival of Confucianism and Maoism, and the creation of new
forms of patriotism and nationalism have come together with the aid of
technological adaptations to provide the first hacker groups with a new and
potentially powerful means to voice their beliefs. The current movements that
have helped establish a Chinese online identity also play a very important role in
the lives and actions of online activists who make up the hacker world.
Since 1979, social and economic reforms have led to a radical
transformation of Chinese society. Individuals are now free to move from one
place to another with the loosening of “household registration” (hukou) policies.
On the other hand, individualization and the power of self-interest over the group
has emerged along with these freedoms. Activism and protests that pertain to
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forms of individualization and rising self-interest have become increasingly
common recently in contrast to the predominantly collective mentality of the Mao
years (1949-1976), and, some would argue, the Confucian collective and familial
bonds of pre-revolutionary China. Many observers within China bemoan the rise
of a greedy and self-centered generation in China, with the lifting of economic
restrictions and the implementation of the “One-Child Policy” also as factors in
possibly fostering a generation of self-interested and materialistic young people
in China. But individualization can also be a strong and beneficial social force
that allows people to identify their specific needs and interests, and then organize
socially and politically in a way that favors their sub-group. Examining the hukou
system, a household registration system that also records social categorizations,
and social circles in Beijing, the analysis examines the individualization and in a
sense, the atomization, of contemporary Chinese society. Farmers are protesting
against local government; migrant workers are fighting for a decent salary;
activist organizations are fighting for protection of the environment; and women
are fighting for equality. The rise in these sub-groups has fueled a growing
culture of individualization where individuals in these groups are fighting for
cultural acceptance, concrete economic gain, and social equality.
As China moves further into the twenty-first century, social activism is
flourishing, with an increased number of social movements. Many of these social
movements in China are still at a nascent stage, and here is something really
new: a generation of younger China scholars that are beginning to explore the
richness of China’s emerging culture of contention with new tools at their
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disposal.
Since the early 1990s, there has been a constant rise in the reporting of
social unrest in China. Reported incidents of social unrest rose from 8,700 in
1994, to 90,000 by 2006, and by 2008 to 127,000.26 Even before the Tiananmen
massacre of June 4, 1989, tensions between the Chinese Communist Party and
individuals and groups within Chinese society had been escalating for decades.
Even now, in the view of many observers, there is a growing divide between a
dynamic economy and vibrant society, and a repressive, archaic system of
governance and political control. These recent changes in the 1990s have been
hopefully labeled by some as the development of “grassroots democracy.”
According to Huang Weiping and Chen Jiaxi of Shenzhen University, “from
village elections, China’s grassroots democracy has undergone a
multidimensional expansion, i.e. from the village to the city, from grassroots
society to grassroots government, from outside of the ruling party to within the
party, and from democratic election to democratic governance. This tendency
indicates the growth of China’s grassroots democracy in terms of width and
depth. China’s democratization is in steady progress and is gradually realizing
the legitimate political rights of citizens and CPC members in the written laws.” 27
The optimism of Huang and Chen is considerable, and it is also noteworthy that
they are dating these new developments and this social ferment to precisely the
era in which the hackers that I am studying are coming of age and taking part in
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their society as adults.
The individuals that comprise of the “Tiananmen generation” are involved
in this new upsurge in political and social action. The knowledge and lessons
learned from the events in 1989 have provided a new collective identity as a new
political generation. This generation has an awareness of a movement that was
repressed and crushed by its own government, and it assists in maintaining an
intensity of public involvement even amidst the cynicism, wariness, or fury. These
lessons influence modern activist positions as environmentalists and
conservationists, human rights campaigners, and advocates of written law. The
circumstances that contributed to the ascension to the modern civilian activism
help illuminate the importance of the early movement to further a cause for
democracy. The rise of the middle class, the advent of the internet and steadily
increasing access, globalization, the maturing of a newer generation, and other
factors have all combined to shape recent Chinese activism.

The Fight for Democracy
Struggles for democracy in China have taken many divergent forms, and
emerge from the twentieth century and tumultuous eras like the May Fourth
Movement and the Cultural Revolution. But calls for democracy returned to the
forefront of Chinese culture with the events of the 1980s leading to the worldfamous Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. This popular movement
paradoxically marked both the high-water mark of democratic movements and
optimism in modern China but also its low point. The military crackdown on June
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4th shattered these democratic ideals.
The reason that the push for democracy and the outlying movements in
the 1990s are so significant is that it has led to many of the issues and
movements of today, and in turn fuels the actions of Chinese activists. China has
quickly revolutionized into a market economy since 1979. In the wave of the
blatant repression of 1989, Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping set in motion
the reform agendas of 1992, but at severe costs. The compromise of forestalling
political reform for the sake of astounding economic growth has been a bargain
many in China have accepted, though not without some opposition. As China
sustains impressive amounts of economic development, the country encounters
environmental degradation, corruption, and social polarization. For example, in
2010 the price of ecological dilapidation in China was about $230 billion USD,
and since taking office in 2012, President Xi has vowed to bring down both
“tigers and flies” in his anti-corruption campaign, going after both top
administrators as well low-level officials.28 This purge of corrupt officers and
administrators like Shanghai vice mayor Ai Baojun, who supervised an important
economic district, as well as a senior CCP official from Beijing named Lu
Xiwen.29 The prevalence of corruption has long been a source of deep
frustration among Chinese activists, and indeed this was a major pillar of the
Tiananmen protests.
28
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Today, an upsurge of protests and social activism is spreading through
China. Compared to the incident in 1989, these new protests are more diverse,
often more clearly and narrowly defined, and generally more moderate. New
problems have moved to the forefront, encompassing everything from the before
mentioned environmental protection, to the protection of ostracized social
classifies, to legal reform, and anti-discrimination. To this day liberty and equality
are still motivating principles, but protesters and advocates are not using the
same outright and confrontational tactics of massive and coordinated protest, as
was seen in 1989, and also in the Jasmine Revolution that swept across Arab
countries in 2011.
Many of these new movements in China use the law in their struggle to
protect citizen’s rights. They also have adopted non-combative methods of
engagement, and make clever manipulation of the internet to construct a solid
foundation for their organizations. In January 2013, Hong Kong professor Benny
Tai suggested the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” effort, in an attempt to
compel the government to endow unadulterated democracy to Hong Kong in
arrangement with quasi-constitution that existed in Hong Kong.30 In response in
June 2014, approximately 800,000 Hong Kong citizens voted in approval of
democracy in an unsanctioned vote prepared by the same effort that Benny
suggested. The next month, approximately 500,000 individuals paraded for
democracy in a movement that continued through the end of the year. This is a
unique movement in a unique or “special” autonomous region of China. Hong
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Kong’s urban protests have not spilled into the mainland, but surely they were
noticed by many there.31

China and the Internet
The greatest form of political action amongst the newest generation in
China is almost certainly online activism. In this modern era dominated by the
internet, Chinese activists are both structured but also spread out, but there is no
question that they comprise a formidable potential force of social change.
However, online activism is predominantly conversational and representational,
comprising written objections in virtual forums, as well as websites dedicated to
protest movements and online petitions. Despite government censorship of
cyberspace, the more powerful of these cultural ideals disperse online at
incredible speeds, which in turn can become unofficial national media events.
The quickness and simplicity of the internet make it an efficient medium for the
expression of criticisms, challenging authority, and expressing dissent.
The growth of the internet as well as the explosion of the reliance on
mobile devices has helped facilitate popular activism all over the globe. Thanks
to the internet and social networks, young Chinese born in the 1990s were born
into a culture that has the potential to learn about the values of democracy,
freedom, and human rights, even if they do not necessarily share American
perspectives on these concepts. In Shifang, a county-level city in Sichuan, China,
students testify that they frequently elude government internet restrictions in
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order to access sites that are barred.32 They refer to this as “jumping the wall”,
and by “jumping the wall” they mean the Great Fire Wall, which is a country wide
program used to sensor the internet in China. China established internet
connectivity in 1994, and it now boasts the greatest number of internet users on
Earth. A critical influence in the growth and expansion of the internet in China is
that it fulfills imperative social desires including the need for information and
communication.
The writer of Chinese Hacker History/Looking Back on the Chinese
Hacker History, Chu Tianbi, states that hacking in China commenced in 1994 as
the citizens first became users of the internet, even if overall internet use was
mainly restricted to “science and technology research personnel” and “rich young
people.” 33 Operators functioned on 9,600-bit/second modems and connected
straight into Bulletin Board System (BBS) servers.34 In term of internet access
today, the connection speed that these individuals operated on was extremely
slow. As Chinese users were introduced to new computer programs, they started
to decipher them practically instantaneously due to their enthrallment. It would
not be until 1995 that users in China would be able to experience proficient
internet service, as some area around mid-sized cities installed their own internet
services and connections. Chu explains this opening stage by asserting: “In their
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view, moving from BBS to the Internet was an expansion of their stage and
allowed them to see a bit more.”35
Ever since this opening of the internet landscape like Chu describes,
internet use in the country has been increasing at a remarkable speed. The
expert on data associated with the Internet in China, the China Internet Network
Information Center, released a publication in 2009 demonstrating that the country
had achieved 298 million online users by the end of the previous year, with an
unparalleled 279 million broadband operators.36 Both of these combined made
China at the time, the greatest consumer of the internet.
A publication named “Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Seven
Chinese Cities” created by the Research Center for Social Development,
provides an assessment of the internet in China in which research was
performed by means of door-to-door interviews throughout the seven most
populated cities within the country in an attempt to explore the consumption of
the internet.37 This examination demonstrates that online users in China are
extraordinarily young. For example, the percentage of implementation for
individuals 24 and younger is over 80 percent. For the adoption rate is between
60 and 80 percent of those users are between the ages of 25 and 29. That
means adoption rate for individuals under the age of 30 is extremely high, and
that the bulk of people under this age are internet operators. The highest internet
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adoption rate belongs to males (57.2 percent), those who are in secondary
education (90 percent), and single (77.2 percent).38
In recent years there has also been a push to cure what is called in China
as internet addiction. According to the article “Breathing is Also an Addiction” by
Hu Yong, this “So-called Internet addition refers to the repeated and excessive
use of the Internet to the point that is becomes a kind of mental disorder. It can
manifest itself as the intense desire to use the Internet repeatedly, and
withdrawal symptoms are often observed when Internet use is decreased.” 39
According to Yong, approximately twenty million individuals in the country suffer
from a type of internet addiction.40 It is even reported that the use of electric
shock therapy on children have been employed to combat the effects of
addiction.
The Chinese government and the general population have always had a
very complex relationship with the internet, yet it is within this culture that
individuals have grown very technologically knowledgeable due to the
government’s censorship of the web and the “Great Firewall” as will be explored
below. With the development of the Internet, this contention and improvisation
has taken on some new forms. Popular protest began taking place in cyberspace
from the earliest days of the internet in China. The first few years of internet
diffusion in China saw only scattered reports of internet protests. It was not until
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1996, that the internet became a significant forum for social protest, prompting an
unprecedented response from the government.

Golden Shield Project (The Great Firewall of China)
In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC introduced a
multifaceted project christened “the Golden Shield”. The intent was to encourage
“the adoption of advanced information and communication technology to
strengthen central police control, responsiveness, and crime combating capacity,
so as to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police work.”41 The endeavor
was initiated fully by 2003, demonstrating the potential to obstruct sensitive or
banned material by fundamentally inhibiting entrance to webpages containing
these types of materials by instantaneously sorting out sites that contain an
amalgamation of pre-prescribed keywords.42 The idea of “internet sovereignty”
was formally introduced legally in June 2010.43 It expands the Party’s assertion of
national sovereignty to cyberspace as well, as the country essentially utilizes the
right to regulator the stream of information from the internet as it reaches its
citizens. This idea of internet sovereignty was once again brought by China to an
international discussion during the World Internet Conference in December 2015,
which was held in China’s Zhejiang province. It was during this event that
President Xi Jingping gave a speech attempting to promote:
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The transformation of the global system of internet governance… [while]
respecting each country’s right to choose its own internet development
path, its own internet management model, its own public policies on the
internet, and to participate on an equal basis in the governance of
international cyberspace — avoiding cyber-hegemony, and avoiding
interference in the internal affairs of other countries.44
The idea of the Chinese modern for internet governance expanding is not
so far-fetched. Russia has long been an advocate of expansion. Russian
authorities have employed the knowledge of Lu Wei, China’s internet authority,
and Fang Binxing, known as the founder of the Firewall, in an attempt to “draw
up plans for a national internet white list... [of] potential exposure to
“’pornography, drugs, paedophiles,’ – scary words.”45 This seems to show that
Russia is embracing the same “internet sovereignty” model that China has in the
past, behind a model similar to China’s Great Firewall.
“Golden Shield” is widely known in popular media as the “Great Firewall of
China.” The project essentially targets the online movements of individual
operating online systems within China and the rest of the global internet. Dr
Lennon Yao-Chung Chang, Assistant Professor and deputy program leader of
the criminology program at the University of Hong Kong, described it as being “
built not only for political purposes, such as blocking websites or messages
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relating to anti-government material or, pro-Taiwan and pro-Tibet matters, it was
also used to monitor websites and block out those related to criminal activities.”46
During times of the year that are deemed sensitive by authorities, thousands of
websites go offline and web servers are shut down. In this sense, the Chinese
government’s control over the internet involves not only content but also timing.
The various tools of state monitors of the internet include blocking specific
search terms, shutting down specific websites, or slowing down connectivity of a
user engaged in activity that is deemed unsavory by government censors. You
cannot search for any information involving the Tiananmen massacre like the
date June 4 for example.47 Equipped with a blacklist of undesirable IP addresses,
routers drop all packets destined to block IPs, which could include the address of
a sensitive site like the New York Times.48 As of April 2016, eight of the top
twenty-five most heavily visited websites globally are censored in China, and
according to the group at Greatfire.org, almost a quarter of the websites
monitored by Chinese authorities end up blocked.49 Take the picture below for
example, which shows that the site hrw.org has been blocked by Chinese
censors. The individual is denied access to a certain page, because the site itself
or the content on that specific page has triggered government censors.
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Figure 3: HRW.org Censorship. The site hrw.org has been blocked by
government censors. The page shows a message explaining that the page could
not be found because of relevant laws and regulations.50

Netizen Movement
The new and rapidly transforming culture that has surrounded the citizens
of China has provided them with a unique opportunity, and has also allowed the
creation of self-realizing sub-groups within the population. The profound diversity
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and complexity of China continues to defy the hasty external prejudiced views of
a homogeneous society that is completely and utterly oppressed. The internet
has been shown to have had a profound effect on these individuals, yet the
government has gone to great lengths to censor the information that is
accessible. This culture has bred a new generation of individuals who are more
familiar with the inner workings of cyberspace as a consequence of the
restrictions placed upon them by their superiors. Firewalls, proxy servers, and
backdoors are often a necessity for them to view information that would not
otherwise be available. This movement is commonly referred to as the “Netizen
movement” due to the fact that its individuals are often referred to as netizens,
which is an abridgement for “internet citizen.” The term “netizen” was coined in a
1992 article by Michael Hauben titled “The Net and Netizens: The Impact the Net
Has on People’s Lives.” and spread rapidly.51 It is usually designated to
individuals who are extremely immersed in cyber communities. Netizens are
distinct from normal internet users in that their emphasis is with manipulating
cyberspace as an instrument to participate in social activities, using the internet
to increase their scope of social influence, and building more connections outside
of their normal social circles. The use of the term netizen has now become nearly
indistinguishable with Chinese internet users.
Although government restriction has helped create a very unique internet
user collective, the government and internet activists can coexist and even
cooperate with each other if the circumstances fulfill both groups’ ideologies.
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This is especially true if netizen action contributes to the Chinese government’s
agenda in any way. A prominent instance of such confluence was centered
around the Olympic torch relay as it crossed France in April of 2008, before the
Beijing Summer Games of that year. The global community debated the ethics of
hosting the Games under the watchful eye of such an authoritarian regime.
Tibetan independence advocates and human rights activists continually made an
effort to impede the relay of the Olympic torch as it made its way through Paris.
Adding more fuel to the fire, the city hall in Paris flew a Tibetan flag and
displayed a banner that proclaimed, “Paris defends human rights throughout the
world.”52 Furthermore, members of the French Parliament brought a halt to a
National Assembly session to reveal a sigil that declared “Respect for Human
Rights in China” while chanting “Freedom for Tibet!”53 The torch was forcibly
extinguished five times amidst scuffles along the route, until the torch relay route
was shortened and a town hall ceremony cancelled.54
In China there was a resounding response that started in the online
community and quickly became physical. A chain of boycotts, protests, and
assaults on any person or anything that represented France was implemented by
thousands and perhaps millions of Chinese individuals. The hardest hit was the
French retailer Carrefour, which had over one hundred shops in China at the
time. There were countless cries throughout cyberspace to boycott goods and
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merchandises from the French retailer.55 An article published online was even
labeled , “Boycott French goods, let’s start with Carrefour.”56 This led to a
congregation of approximately one thousand protesters outside a Carrefour store
in the city of Wuhan, and it expanded to encompass the rest of China as well.
Amidst the protests were accusations that retailer advocated for Tibetan
independence and championed the cause of the Dalai Lama. (To be precise, the
Dalai Lama does not currently advocate Tibetan independence, but rather
increased autonomy and cultural freedom for the region.) It was contended that
the episode turned out a public-relations catastrophe for the Chinese
government, while some believed that the concentration of the attention that was
placed upon the protestors as primarily upholding and portraying a sense of
nationalism. The online campaign surrounding this and other related incidents
reflected the confluence of popular netizen activism and the state agenda of
promoting patriotism and China’s image abroad.
Another form of resistance that is common to the country is online
hacktivism and related hacking endeavors, although these are considered highly
controversial throughout the rest of the world. A significant example of this that is
prevalent in China is government website defacement where a government or
state organization’s webpage is hacked and a political message is left for the
public’s viewing. In December 2008, the official website for the city’s Bureau of
Commerce in Jingzhou was hacked and swapped with a picture of a woman
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dressed in very revealing attire, with the photograph of the leader of the
organization substituted with a statement suggesting immoral behavior on his
part. Cases like this have a tendency to be linked to corruption of officials.
Various other cases of hackers assaulting webpages in an attempt to stimulate
political awareness are very common in media portrayals in today’s age. There
are other significant examples of this; a Japanese webpage dedicated to the
Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese military personnel that seized China during
World War II are being revered, including class A war criminals, was vandalized
by a hacker collection out of China.
The People’s Republic of China has executed a number of significant
suppressions of webpages in China that were purportedly operating contrary to
government guidelines. In 2004, two prominent organizations that provide blog
services, BlogBus and Blogcn, were restricted to users for the short term due to
offensive matter concerning the events in 1989 as well as the 2003 government
management of the SARS incident.57 During 2005, the online crackdown by
Chinese authorities escalated as authorities pursued not only the major
webpages but, furthermore, the bulletin board systems of significant universities.
This suppression led to very aggressive demonstrations in the form of two large
student protests against the actions of the authorities.5859
Although it was covered up quickly, one of these demonstrations in 2005
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took place at Tsinghua University and saw over one hundred students come
together in protest. The students also requested that the institution resist the
government. The school was under pressure by authorities to restrict their
internet privileges to only those within the university. This essentially meant that
public servers would be shut down. That would have meant that public users,
who make important contribution to the conversation, are not able to access
these BBS any more.60 A comparable protest of approximately two hundred
individuals took place at Nanjing University. Disapproval of the government’s
response extended throughout the country with media articles with headings like
“Universities Should Not Build Walls Around the Internet.”61

Nationalism
Nationalism has developed into one of the more significant influences
behind group actions, albeit it is a somewhat contemporary trend that followed
the birth of the modern countries in Europe in the nineteenth century and then
throughout the rest of the world. In Imagined Communities by Benedict
Anderson, a nation is an “imagined community” that has been socially
constructed by individuals who imagine themselves as part of a larger
collective.62 It is this idea of “community” creates a larger sense of nationalism.
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For some observers, there is much to criticize in China’s rush to modernity and
global prominence in the past forty years: the crackdown on Tiananmen Square
in 1989, the long history of governmental censorship, the brutal eviction of poor
residents outside of cities during redevelopment projects, a draconian population
policy, cultural chauvinism at China’s ethnic frontiers, human rights violations,
and much more.
During the first three decades of communist power, Marxist philosophy
went hand in hand with nationalism. Since the late 1970s, however, these
ideologies have been supplanted by economic principles, and nationalism has
become one of the strongest forces that push these ideologies into the more
modern era. This was particularly accurate after the 1989 government crackdown
on protests in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere. As related to China’s youth,
nationalism has been a driving force in the developments of both the political and
cultural realms of the nation. The internet has provided an entirely new place for
individuals to share and build upon nationalist sentiment, especially among the
idealistic youth. The summer of 2003 is one example. This was a time that
exhibited a rising anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese youth. Tensions grew
out of issues surrounding the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands in the East
China Sea, which were a growing tension between the two nations. A popular
movement emerged later that year, and escalated into a signed petition of over
ten thousand individuals opposing the use of Japanese technology in a highspeed train under development. 2003 also was a significant step forward for
online nationalism. Without a doubt, it is this emotion that was replicated to night
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precision on a webpage linked to the Red Hacker Alliance (to be examined
further below) called Iron and Blood Union (tiě ér xuèyè shètuán). The site
expressed the standpoint of the group by stating that “The goal of this
community: Is to grieve for the prior generation and to never forget the nation’s
shame; to use history as an example for facing the future.”63

Figure 4: Nationalism: An International Comparison. Note: Nationalism is an
imputed factor index of four survey questions. The scale ranges from 0 to 100.
Source: National Identity Survey II, International Social Survey Programme,
2003, and 2008 China Survey.
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Chinese nationalism and national identity construction have garnered
much attention in recent years. Pro-China demonstrations in 2008 during the
Olympic torch relay as well as anti-Japanese demonstrations in spring 2005,
September 2010, and September 2012, have raised concerns abroad about the
nature of Chinese nationalism and national identity. Indeed some observers
believe that these protests raise concerns in Beijing about its own ability to
control this kind of nationalist sentiment.
Most analysts agree that nationalism is currently a powerful source of
legitimacy for the CCP and its hold on power.64 The figure above represents a
National Identity Survey that indexes nationalism of the global community. On a
scale from 0 to 100 based on survey questions given to the public, China ranks
first with a rating of 80, followed closely by the United States at 76. To further
analyze national identity in the country, students at Beijing University (1,346 total)
were asked to take part in a survey in spring 2007.65 This survey found that both
Chinese Communist Party supporters and individuals with rural upbringings
showed greater levels of nationalism than individuals who did not fall under either
category. The Communist party regards students and young people in urban
areas as more likely to participate in protest movements over foreign policy
issues, which makes this segment of the population “most likely of greatest

64

Downs and Saunders 1999, 118; Laliberté and Lantegne 2008,
Sinkkonen, Elina. "Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among Chinese
University Students." The China Quarterly 216 (2013): 1045-063. Web.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9113316&fileId=S030
5741013001094
65

49

concern to Chinese leaders.”66 Students have been active in some of the
Chinese nationalist movements and other protest movements, but we know little
about their unfiltered opinions, perhaps with the exception of those who are
active online. It is within recent research like the university survey were it has
become evident that Chinese nationalism is a growing phenomenon
This research comes to five conclusions. First, in the Chinese context,
nationalism and patriotism are fundamentally distinct, but have a significant effect
on those who were interviewed. According to Oxford English dictionary,
nationalism is defined as a patriotic sentiment; and patriotism as a passionate
protection of the nation’s success and independence from which they identify.67
Chinese nationalism centers on the idea of returning China to its former
greatness prior to the late Qing era and the fall of the imperial system. Patriotism
differs from nationalism in China as it usually pertains to individuals with a sense
of responsibility to both the nation and the Party. The second conclusion of the
research states that nationalism has stronger links with foreign policy
predilections than that of patriotism. “Patriots” and “nationalists” differed in their
views in all other foreign policy statements except for the statement concerning
Taiwan, which indicates that the Taiwan issue seems to unite people with
otherwise different views. In the 2007 data, only 6.8 per cent of respondents
were against or strongly against the use of force if Taiwan declared
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independence.6869 Third, the answer to the research question of whether
Chinese individuals who are more nationalistic differ from less nationalistic
Chinese in their foreign policy attitudes is clearly a resounding yes. The political
attitudes of Chinese citizens are very much reflective upon their nationalistic
qualities. This research has shown that compared to nationalism, patriotism in
China is connected with more accommodating and globalized outlooks, whereas
the other individuals have a tendency back economic security. Nationalism is
usually linked to the idea of a greater “China,” while patriotism is linked to the
Communist party. It is also true that nationalistic online behavior offers protection
in opposition to government enquiry and potential intervention, since it is clearly
not undermining the cultural and political authority of the government, at least on
the surface. By PRC criteria, this encompasses a significantly sized collection of
peoples with shared connections that are hard to supervise and regulate. Within
China, a hacking organization could find itself censored, broken up, and even
subjected to legal punishment of they become an opposition and do not show
support for the PRC or the CCP.
In the world of Chinese hackers, nationalism and patriotism are very
similar. Individuals who are labeled “patriotic hackers” usually follow a more
nationalistic sense, as in, they are more worried about China as a whole and not
so much the Communist party. The term “patriotic” hacker is more common in the
68
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western work than “nationalistic” hacker. Chinese hackers include both qualities
that comprise of nationalism and patriotism.
The growth of the internet as well as the explosion of the reliance on
mobile devices has helped facilitate popular activism all over the globe. Thanks
to the internet and social networks, young Chinese born in the 1990s were born
into a culture that has the potential to learn about the values of democracy,
freedom, and human rights. Nationalism has developed into one of the more
significant influences behind group actions. In the past, Marxism and government
ideologies went hand in hand with nationalism. Even today the government
attempts to facilitate nationalistic values. There is a relevant phenomenon called
the 50 Cent Party in which the government pays individuals to post fake
comments on internet pages to promote the government’s ideologies. These
individuals gain their name because these individuals are supposedly paid “50
cents of Renminbi” for every post.70
In January 2016, the agency in charge of censorship of the internet in
China convened at the National Online Propaganda Work Conference with the
focus of specific tasks. According to the People’s Daily, the agency called for a
focus on, “deepening online propaganda… so that the theoretical innovations
and practical achievements of the Party become the lofty main tone and main
theme of the online space,” as well as “fully leveraging websites, online social
organisations and internet users, achieving comprehensive [internet]
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management through multiparty execution of policies.”71 This shows that the
Party’s management of the internet and of its users continue even now, and will
continue into the future. Although from a western perspective this sounds
incredibly bad, in China and in President Xi Jingping’s mind, it is most definitely
not. The president calls in “spreading positive energy”, and it follows the idea that
the country can transform itself it the face of ever-changing public opinion that
have been challenged by new technologies.72 So, there are very good intentions
behind the Party’s control of the internet as positive energy is intended to
contribute the mobilization of the populace behind the party.
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CHAPTER TWO:
WHAT DEFINES THE HACKER CULTURE?
A new culture has developed in China in which some expressions of
beliefs can be deemed unacceptable and censored in various forums. These
constraints on some kinds of expression on sensitive topics were most obviously
apparent in the government’s actions in suppressing the 1989 protests, and a
powerfully chilling effect has been seen in many forums and venues of public
expression. Many who sought to speak their minds on some sensitive topics
usually constrained their communication to their immediate social circles. This
became the status quo immediately after Tiananmen, and would remain so until
the explosion of the internet midway through the 1990s. Then individuals found a
new platform and while still circumscribed in some ways, there were efforts to
keep the internet as a forum for free expression. This sometimes involved and
still involves coded references to sensitive political events (like “May 35” as a
reference to June 4, 1989), but creative and savvy efforts have continued to push
the limits of expression on the internet within China, beginning in the 1990s. In
this regard, one can say that this new Chinese culture led to the creation and
growth of a hacker culture, as well as further defining what exactly a hacker
culture is on the global scale. Since 1999, online public opinion has gone through
three distinct phases: infancy, development, and expansion. These phases begin
with the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (more on this later) when
the People’s Daily established forums for public opinion. This phase escalated
into yet another in 2003 in what is known as “the year of online public opinion”,
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where online conviction first swayed government policy. Finally, the country
moved into the last phase of independent interpersonal communications,
collaboration, and involvement acknowledged as Web 2.0.73 Throughout these
phases a new sub-culture emerged.
The term “hacker” was initially attributed to individuals who can modify
computer systems and programs in an attempt to accomplish tasks that were
beyond the inherent or intended design of the system.74 However, as technology
advanced and the true power of computer hacking was unleashed, individuals
from all walks of life soon discovered the utility of hacking as well as its
destructive and criminal capabilities. Hacking now extends to include organized
gangs attempting to steal financial information, state-affiliated espionage groups
who steal massive amounts of intellectual property, saboteurs and anarchists
attempting to destroy critical infrastructures, and other actors. There are also
countless small-scale criminals launching attacks for a wide variety of reasons.
Most popular preconceptions about computer hackers reasonably include
a criminal view. We should note from the outset, though, that this is no longer the
case. Governments and state-sponsored actors, including the United States,
China, and many others now employ cybersecurity experts whose duties include
not only defense, but also offensive cyber espionage and hacking. There is a
large group within the broader hacking community that uses their computer
prowess for legal gains.
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There is also a youthful shift as new generations are raised in a world
where so much of daily life and daily interaction takes place online. Majid Yar,
professor of Sociology at the University of Hull, believes that there is a “youth
problem” in hacking around the world. Yar attributes two significant factors to the
youth movement in hacking, which tends to have an overwhelming male hacker
presence as well as being university dropouts in their twenties.75 Yar points to
youth as a stage of unavoidable psychological chaos. This has a tendency to
lead to involvement in different types of criminal conduct. He also suggests the
“ethical deficit” among these youths that lead them towards illegal behavior. This
new generation of computer hackers, raised in a computer-based globalized
world, push the boundaries of what is acceptable due to a great variety of
motivations. These motivations can potentially make each individual hacker
different, but they also help us to broadly classify and understand these
individuals.
Hackers are commonly categorized into one of three classes depending
on the individual’s or group motivations: black hat, white hat, and grey hat
hackers. Those who are classified as black hat hackers tend to be the most
dangerous. They tend to explore criminal ventures, revenge, sabotage, or illegal
financial gain. This financial gain could include the theft of money, products,
resources, blueprints or plans, or services. Black hat hackers can vary from
beginners just starting to learn their way around systems by distributing malware,
which are software programs that are created with the intent to harm or perform
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further unsolicited activities on a computer system, to skilled professionals with
intent to pilfer information.76 White-hat hackers tend to explore security
weaknesses in an attempt to strengthen or develop more secure computer
systems, for the sake of industry knowledge and/or for legal financial gain. White
hat hackers can be freelancers or employees of businesses as security
consultants that are paid to intentionally break into systems to find security
issues.77 Grey hat hackers are the weakest and least dangerous of the three.
They explore systems and their weaknesses perhaps out of personal curiosity, to
achieve notoriety amongst their immediate social groups, or purely for selffulfillment. Grey hat hackers usually do not cause harm to their targets, “they’re
just looking to get something out of their discoveries for themselves.”78 According
to Peng Yinan, one of China’s most prolific hackers, “Chinese hackers are similar
to Western meanings and really nothing more that the three types: black hat
hackers (hei maozi), white hat hackers (bai maozi), and grey hat hackers (hui
maozi).”79
Hackers perform attacks or infiltrate systems for a variety of reasons.
These motivations can include testing their skills, gaining recognition, making
money, and supporting a political agenda. Some hack alone, and some hack in
groups. Modern computer hackers attack or infiltrate systems in a variety of
ways. While it is very easy to get lost in the terminology found in the world of
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hacking, there are a few significant types of attacks that are common and for the
sake of this study, they should be sketched out in brief: phishing/malware, SQL
injection, DDOS, insider threat/theft, and vulnerability exploits. The figure below
shows the attack cycle that is most common, with cyber-attacks starting with
defining the target and ending with covering up tracks.

Figure 5: Advanced Persistent Threat Lifecycle.80
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Table 1: Common Types of Hacking Attacks
Type of Attack
Phishing

Definition
This is a form of deception where
the assailant attempts to gather
personal information like login
identifications, or identity information
through email, instant messages, and
other channels. Often times the attacker
uses reputable names or fraudulent
claims to attract individuals into initiating
communication.
Malware
These are software programs
designed to damage, freeze, or perform
any other unwanted actions without the
knowledge of the user. Common
examples include viruses, spyware, and
“Trojan horses.” A Trojan horse
program is usually
malevolent/destructive in nature and
commonly concealed inside another
program or downloadable data.
SQL Injection (Structured Query
This is a form of security exploit
Language)
in which the systems infiltrator adds
SQL code in an attempt to obtain
entrance to information or resources, or
to make system changes. This type of
attack allows the attacker to gain
access to information systems through
automated tools, which increases the
scope and overall damage to computer
systems.
DDoS (Distributed denial-ofA DDoS strike is when a variety
service)
of systems assault a lone objective.
Essentially, a flood of messages force
the system to shut down, resulting in a
rejection of access for the ordinary
operators of the besieged system. The
types of DDoS attacks are when an
attack over encumbers the server by
expending all the allotted bandwidth
through a network-centric assault, and a
program-based strike that overburdens
a system by initiating applications.
Insider Threat and Theft
This is a malicious hacker who
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Vulnerability exploit

can physically access the information
systems of a business, institution, or
agency. Insider threats are often
disgruntled employees or ex-employees
that are seeking revenge or financial
gain. A recent example of this is the
Edward Snowden NSA case. Snowden
physically walked in with a flash drive,
and walked out with classified
information.
These also include zero-day
exploits, and take advantage of security
vulnerability as they are discovered.
These include installing malware,
spyware, or just allowing unwanted
access to information. In the case of
zero-day exploits, since the vulnerability
is not known in advance, there is no
way to guard against the exploitation
before it happens. Zero-day
vulnerabilities are the holy grail of
modern hacking tools.

Responses to Cyber-Attacks
Defense was the predominant approach to internet security during the
internet’s earliest days. The basic idea was to secure a network with systems
that could prevent intrusion, such as firewalls, for example. These systems were
created with the ability to keep logs of suspicious codes, as well as the ability to
detect suspicious patterns. They would continually be updated so as to keep up
with newly emerging threats. One related issue was that this system depended
heavily on a user’s ability to personally update antivirus software. According to
Tom Kellerman, vice-president of the U.S. security firm Trend Micro, “You keep
the crown jewels on the inside, and you build electronic walls and a moat around
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them.”81 This strategy only works well if the attacks are from small-scale hackers,
whose attacks are scattered and random. These individuals are simply
attempting to find an easy way in, and as they hit obstructions, they generally
move on to the next target.

Figure 6: Types of Cyber Crime Attacks in 2015. 82
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Figure 7: Types of Attacks in December 2013.83
However, in recent years these types of security systems are failing to
stop the more aggressive actors who are making the most of the technological
advancements of the modern era. There has been a rise in what is known as
“targeted attacks,” where an attacker invades a specific organization, agency, or
individual. These individuals or groups usually also have a specific goal or
system in mind prior to the attack and are not randomly looking for vulnerabilities.
No individual or network is completely safe from these hacks, as has been
demonstrated on numerous occasions, and any given person can be the target of
a hacker’s attack. Any system can be tainted just by merely opening a
communication or visiting the incorrect site. “Up until four years ago, we kind of
83
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had a handle on this shit,” Tom Kellermann said in 2013. “Virus scanning and
encryption and firewalls were doing a pretty good job. But the latest attack kits
are bypassing those perimeter defenses, which is why this paradigm has to
shift.”84
The eruption of hacking is a natural outcome of progress in the networking
tools that has grown around the internet, as well as by the widespread operation
of computers all around the globe. The online systems of the better part of
contemporary are all in danger of being destroyed or pillaged from outside
threats, and we are frequently reminded of this when news breaks of another
high-profile hack or leak. One group alone from China, codenamed APT1
(Advanced Persistent Threat 1), has methodically appropriated hundreds of
terabytes of information from at least one hundred and forty one establishments,
and have proven that they have the ability and goal of taking from a great amount
of individuals and establishments instantaneously.85
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Figure 8: Targeted Systems and Motivations in 2013.86
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Figure 9: November 2013 Attacks. Distribution of targets, industries attacked,
and types of organizations of November 201387

Who Are These Hackers?
Hackers come from all walks of life and from just about every nationality,
and the Chinese hacking community is little different in this respect. Active
individually as well as in thousands of cyber groups, Chinese hackers represent
a community of practitioners that have developed a maturity unmatched at such
a large level. Other groups around the world might have more technological
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knowledge of systems and tools, like the NSA, but Chinese hacking groups are
far greater in number. So in reality, due to sheer numbers and the fact that many
of these individuals are self-taught, the Chinese hacking community exists on a
far grander level than other global hacking groups that are smaller coalitions.
They have developed a similar knowledge base to other hackers around the
world. Their communities contain many layers of different groups that range from
black-hat hackers, malware tool developers, novices and expert computer
system explorers, and legitimate legal security analysts and researchers.
There are many publications in China that glorify patriotic hackers. This
recent trend helps show that hackers are experiencing a esteemed place in the
internet culture in China, and perhaps in the wider society. Books about hackers
like Cliff Stoll’s 1989 book, The Cuckoo’s Egg, are common, and are making
Chinese citizens familiar with the same ideologies of the individuals who target
political enemies around the world.88 In the face of the recent attempts by the
Chinese government to crack down on hacking within the country, it still
continues to be a growing business in China, and it is extending its reaches
globally. Four significant search engines exist that allowed this community
access to the tools and information that it needs: Baidu, Google China, Google
US, and Yahoo! China. All four of these engines provide ample links to hacker
sites, blogs, and forums with just a simple search of the common Chinese term
for hackers, “黑客,” heike, which sounds something like “hacker” and ominously
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translates as “black guest.”89 It is within sites where hackers can develop greater
social circles in which information on certain networks and tools can be spread.
New hackers can learn how, as well as what, is needed to hack based on
information found on hacker sites, blogs, and forums. It is not uncommon for
homegrown self-taught hackers to be created by these means.
Motivations behind hacking in China can be categorized in one of four
ways: nationalism, technical interest, financial gain, and/or fame. For example,
when political conflict and personal interest are no longer efficient motivations for
hackers, money and fame become the primary motivations keeping Chinese
hacking organizations from disbanding. In an interview that I performed with a
former member of Anonymous Serbia, the motivation of fame was touched on.
He mentioned about making connections with hackers that “once you are in the
journalism field people start trusting you and that's how hackers, cyber criminals,
and other actors share the inside stories of their work and hey, who don't like
fame? So yeah, they love to get into the news and share their stories.”90 In an
interview published by HackRead, the Chinese hacker who uses the name “7zi”
explained his initiation into the hacking sphere and how motivations even for one
individual are constantly changing. In what started as a fiscal venture with few
restrictions, 7zi found that political motivations gradually became more and more
important to him. “I did not work and because of shortage of funds, I began to
visit hacker circles (online). A brother suggested that I undertake a number of
underground transactions... But I hate to attack the government and education
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network [sic], so I did not accept this type of business. I am a patriotic young
person, and when the Philippines policeman hijacked the bus full of Chinese, I
took part in the back [sic] on the president of the Philippines Department of
Communications.”91 This individual’s story shows us how difficult it is to track the
motivations of hackers in China. Not only is there a broad spectrum of
motivations, but even one individual may fluctuate between different motivating
forces depending on matters ranging from geopolitics to personal finance.
Many of these individuals also generate income by marketing the culture
around them. Besides illegal monetary gains, hackers in China exist in a culture
that loves and reveres them. Newspapers clamor to interview them, universities
strive to create them, and books and other publications are written based on
them. Some thrive openly in the public sector, and even publish their own hacker
magazines and webpages. The Chinese hacking culture is nothing like anything
found elsewhere around the globe. One example that reflects the popularity of
hacking in China, is the Blue Lotus Capture the Flag Competition (CTF). One of
the world’s largest hacking competitions, the Blue-Lotus competition is held in
mainland China where competitors compete at solving individual hacking-based
tasks. On April 26, 2015, Jiaotong University held its second annual CTF
tournament titled 0CTF 2015, or the Information Security Technology Challenge.
Over 654 hacking teams from all over the globe participated, including teams
from Shanghai Jiaotong University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University,
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Wuhan University, Fuzhou
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University, and top international hackers.92
Another term that revolves around Chinese hacking is hacktivism. The
term defines an act of breaching a system based on political and/or social
motivations. The individual who performs these acts use similar implements and
methods as any other hacker. This kind of attacker may perhaps leave a
noticeable comment or note with words or images that reflect a distinct point-ofview on a webpage experiences a significant number of visitors. This type of
attack is hidden at the very root of hacking culture in China. In April 2001,
Chinese hacktivists posted political homages to Chinese pilot Lieutenant
Commander Wang Wei on American sites linked to the government and military.
These consisted of the site belonging to the United States Geological Survey
administration, as well as an offshoot site of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Naval Surface Force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet
webpage.93 Wang Wei was killed following a collision with a U.S. Naval
surveillance plane over the South China Sea.94
Hacker culture in China was largely formed around these types of cultural
and political events. One of the earliest, largest and most enduring active hacking
groups in China was the Red Hacker Alliance. The alliance was a large coalition
of smaller groups that banded together to voice their opinions on political events
at the time. Prior to the group’s formation hackers worked individually or in very
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small and close-knit groups. Take the more current examples of Edward
Snowden and Anonymous for example. Both of these cases outline the
individualism or closeness that hackers usually exhibit. Snowden was the sole
contributor to the theft and leak of government information and Anonymous is a
close-knit group of expert hackers whose reach spans the entire globe.
There are other worldwide incidents where political actions and cyberwarfare combine much like the above 2001 case. The global hacking group
Anonymous is perhaps the highest-profile entity in discussions of political
hacking groups. Their actions, like the case of the Motion Picture Association of
America and Recording Industry Association of America discussed earlier, are a
staple of the hacking landscape. Another case that made the media rounds was
that of Edward Snowden. The Snowden scandal began in June 2013 when the
newspaper, The Guardian reported that the NSA (National Security Agency) was
gathering information based on the phone records of millions of U.S. citizens.
The organization monitored the systems and records of nine internet major
companies to trace cyber communications in a program named PRISM (Planning
Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management).95 The NSA
released a statement, right after the first news stories, calling PRISM “the most
significant tool in the NSA’s arsenal for the detection, identification, and
disruption of terrorist threats to the US and around the world.”96 Since its
creation, the NSA has become one of the strongest cyber groups in the world,
with cyber-capabilities that far out-strip entire nations.
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The Chinese government and the PLA has developed systems much like
the NSA in an attempt to match the cyber-capabilities of other leading nations
like the U.S., Russia, and Iran. This is evident in the PLA’s creation of the Third
General Staff Department for Signals Intelligence. Similar to the NSA in that it is
a government created group dedicated to and specialized information warfare
militia units. In May 2011, the country proclaimed that it had created a “Blue
Army” cyber command division of individuals who were recruited from the armed
forces, universities, and experts from security organizations.97
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE HACKERS
Even though the internet was established in China in 1994, there were
only seven rudimentary hacker webpages three years later in 1997. The pages
available to Chinese individuals were usually reprints and copied information
from foreign sites. Most Chinese hackers at the time were very simple in their
methodology, and used email-based attacks that were supplied in prepackaged
toolkits. Needless to say, the hacker culture was nothing like what exists today.
The complexities of modern global or national attacks did not exist.98
There would, however, be a significant explosion in hacking activity in
1999, centered around the Indonesian riots of 1998 that came after a financial
calamity and saw Chinese individuals in Jakarta targeted by mob violence. A
significant amount of the Indonesian populace discriminatorily held responsible
the Indonesian Sino-community for the rampant inflation that was occurring
within the country, leading to Indonesian civilians targeting their Chinese
counterparts with violence, rape, and sometimes murder. This would mark a twofold evolution that would forever change the Chinese hacking landscape forever.
The first change was from simplistic tampering to malicious attackers. The
second was in the scope and complexity of the attacks as these groups moved
into the twenty-first century. The overall change between the two can be seen as
hacker groups moved away from actions like defacing foreign governmental
websites to the simultaneous multi-national cyber-attacks that have become
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common in the last few years. In recent years, it has consistently been the latter
forms of attacks causing significant damage to global infrastructures and
becoming a hot-button issue for political discussion.
Before the Indonesia riots, few significant hacking organizations existed.
Nothing close to an alliance or a group of hackers existed in the years 1995 and
1996. There is nothing at the time that suggests that forms of communication
other than rare chat room discussions were taking place between hackers.
During this time, Gao Chunhui’s webpage was the only forum in China dedicated
to anything resembling to hacking as we understand it today, and even Gao’s
page contained subject matter mainly pertaining to cracking software code.
In 1997, the largest organized hacking group at the time went by the name
the Green Army, alternatively known by the name Whampoa (Huangpu)
Academy. Both names are historical references, the first to a Qing dynasty
(1644-1911) military force, and the second to a famous military academy of the
1920s run by the Nationalist government, but where both Nationalist and
Communist future military leaders were first trained. This group is reported to
have had a membership of approximately 3000 at its height. Operating in
Shanghai, Beijing, and Shijazhuang, the group was established by a cyber expert
that went by the pseudonym “Goodwill.” The group also drew in further
individuals and together they encompassed was is now deemed the country’s
first group of hackers, such as Cheng Weishan, Peng Quan, Xie Zhaoxia, Huang
Lei, and “Little Rong.”99 In 2000. the collection dispersed and is now commonly

99

Henderson, Scott J. The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of Chinese Hackers. Scott Henderson,
2007. Print.

73

known as a great example of the lasting representations of the Chinese hacker
culture.100 The groups was also one of the first to make successful commercial
ventures as well through its Beijing Green Alliance offshoot, which would lead to
its collapse. The collective of hackers would invariably split in to two groups, with
that former moving into the business of more legalized operations, and the latter
(Beijing Green Alliance) continuing the group’s illegal hacking efforts. A legal
battle insued between the two groups in 2000 leading to a ruling in favor of the
Beijing Green Alliance, in which they were granted financial restitution as well as
control of the group’s web domain (isbase.com).

1998- The Birth of Chinese Hacking
The year of 1998 is considered by most scholars to be the true birth of
Chinese hacking. There were two incidents that combined to become the catalyst
that produced China’s unique hacker culture. The first incident happened outside
of China with the release of the “Back Orifice Program” by the American hacking
group, “Cult of the Dead Cow.”101 After the program was released, Chinese
hackers gained access to its valuable source code and it became a new tool in
their repertoire. This program was responsible for the increased use of the nowcommon Trojan horse virus, which is characterized by its concealment within
another program and its malevolent/destructive nature.
The second part of this two-pronged catalyst came with the Indonesian
riots of 1998 and subsequent cyber-conflicts. With the exception of the Green
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Army, large unified hacker groups did not exist in China as they do now.
Tentative communications were developing within the nascent community, and
coalitions were starting to form (like the Green Army), but there was not a binding
ideology in place to bring these new hackers together. This would all change with
the incidents in Jakarta, Indonesia. In May 1998, riots swept through Jakarta
after a financial crisis devastated the country. Inquiries by human rights
organizations revealed that many of the targets of the hostility were from
Jakarta’s Chinese community. It was a methodical process of discrimination that
included the armed forces and law enforcement.102 Some ethnic Chinese
communities were victimized in a number of atrocities, including rapes, murders,
and the destruction of Chinese property and businesses.103
Stories from Indonesia reached Chinese cyberspace, and spread like
wildfire in online communities. The shock brought on by the violence was quickly
replaced by outrage.104 The individual hackers and budding hacker groups that
commonly patrolled online communities had found their common cause. A
spontaneous gathering of hackers took place in what are known as IRC (Internet
Relay Chat) chat rooms.105 Together, the first Chinese hacktivist groups were
formed. In political retaliation, these groups worked together to attack the
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Indonesian government’s website by bombarding their e-mail system. It was a
primitive attack in comparison to attacks a decade later, but it was the first
collective demonstration of cyber-force that Chinese hackers showed, and it was
a crucial moment in the development of China’s hacker community as it exists
today.
On August 7, 1998, what had originally started as e-mail-based attacks
escalated into website defacement. Chinese hackers obtained access to several
web pages from Indonesia, and to show the strength of their attack, the hackers
attached the addresses of other defaced web sites.106 The online publication
China Byte broke the news of the attacks to individuals with e-mail subscriptions,
and soon after, news of the cyber-attacks spread. The email published the same
message that the hackers published on the page: “Your site has been hacked by
a group of hackers from China. Indonesian thugs, there can be retribution for
your atrocities, stop slaughtering the Chinese people [sic].”107 As the attacks
continued, other sites were vandalized with other political statements. One of
these statements, on the homepage of the Indonesian National Family Planning
Coordinating Board, was supplanted with a statement exclaiming “Warning from
Chinese. This page is hacked for your national day. Please keep this page for 48
hours and punish the murderers in May immediately [sic].”108
The Indonesian riots also give birth to what would become the “Red
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Hacker Alliance”, one of the most significant cyber-groups in the internet’s short
history. The political nature of this patriotic campaign led to the creation of
something entirely new, and would be the first time the term “red hacker” (红客
hongke) would be used. The attacks in the country functioned as the facilitator
that brought together individuals who normally operated independently under the
guise of nationalism, establishing not only a group but also the notion of red
hackers which still exists today.109 As a present affiliate of the Red Hacker
Alliance known as “Sharp Winner” states, it exists as “a group of patriotic youth
active on the net engaged in attacks on Indonesian government web sites, under
the alias ‘China Red hackers.’ This patriotic action received a great deal of
reporting and praise in the domestic and overseas media. The name China red
hackers began here.”110
A year later, in July of 1999, Chinese hackers would once again have
political motivations to perform collective actions. This was the first such event
since the attacks on Indonesia. These attacks centered on Taiwanese President
Lee Teng-hui’s (Li Denghui) “Two-States Theory,” which advocated the idea that
it was an independent country. This perceived threat to the One China Policy and
the nation’s sovereignty sparked political attacks by Chinese hackers on
Taiwanese targets. On August 7, 1999, hackers attacked ten Taiwanese
government pages, leaving statements like “There is only one China in the world
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and the world only needs one China.”111 The same Chinese hackers went on to
sabotage state, college, and industrial webpages. The assaults allegedly
included more than one hundred and sixty penetrations of the nationwide
computer systems of Taiwan.112
This event would become what is now known as the First Taiwan-China
Hacker War. It played a crucial role in how Chinese hackers would engage in
future attacks. This is the point when the first malicious attacks by Chinese
hackers took place. Before 1999, hackers merely e-mail bombed, performed
denial-of-service attacks, or left political messages on websites. It was during this
war that two different malicious programs were developed and used that would
change the Chinese cyber-landscape forever.

Tools of the Trade
It would mark the beginning of a new era where programs were created in
China instead of being brought in from elsewhere. The first program created in
this way was the Glacier Trojan Horse virus, by security programmer Huang Xin.
The Trojan horse virus Netspy (inspired by the above-mentioned Cult of the
Dead Cow’s Back Orifice) followed Glacier, and both would become a hacker
staple for years to come. Other hacking tools created in this period included
Black Hole, Network Thief, XSan and YAI. Glacier, Black Hole, and Network
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Thief are still essential tools for hackers in China, and offshoot versions of each
have been developed.113 These new programs do indeed mark a shift in the
Chinese hacking landscape, and as hackers deployed the newly developed
“Glacier” and “NetSpy” for the first time they invariably moved away from minor
intrusions and into a realm of maliciousness.
In Chu Tianbi’s writing Chinese Hacker History/Looking Back on Chinese
Hacker History, he adds that the Taiwan-China Hacker War led to the formation
of hacker classifications (red hackers, blue hackers, and black hackers).
In addition, it was also in this year that the entirely new concept of ‘Blue
Hackers’ arose. During this time, Chinese hackers could essentially be
divided into three categories. One was hackers with a political and
nationalistic bent represented by the Chinese Red Hackers. Another was
the technical hackers purely interested in Internet security technology and
not concerned with other issues, represented by the Blue Hackers. The
last type was the original ‘Black’ Hackers who were entirely concerned
with pursuit of the original hacker spirit and did not focus on politics or the
frenzied pursuit of technology.114
These hacker classifications do not follow the normal categorization of
traditional hacker cultures noted above (black, white, and grey hat hackers), but
is the best description of Chinese hacker culture due to the deep patriotic and
nationalistic beliefs that fueled hackers in China for many years. Even today,
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hacker culture is routinely fueled by political events, although these initial groups
have largely moved into the “blue hacker” category.
The Chinese hacker community continued to make huge strides after the
cyber-feud with Taiwan. Less than a year later, another incident sparked the
same nationalistic fervor. On May 7, 1999, the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia
was bombarded by U.S.-led forces during the Kosovo War. The bombing was
declared to be a tragic accident by the Americans, and blamed on using old
maps of the city of Belgrade. The incident resulted in the deaths of three
Chinese. According to Tianbi, “the second day after the bombing of the Chinese
embassy, the first Chinese Red Hacker web site appeared, and a new type of
hacker was born – the Red Hacker.”115 This attack in consort with the assaults on
Taiwan in 1998 aided in solidifying the international position of Chinese hackers
as a collective, prepared to partake in politically driven denial-of-service attacks,
data destruction, and website defacement. Yet, it was not until 1998-1999 that
these individuals banded together in groups like the “Red Hacker Alliance.” The
group exchanged vandalism and DDoS strikes with their enemies in Taiwan, the
United States, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea and functioned with freedom
until disapprovals delivered from the Chinese government and the threat of
prosecution basically ended the attacks.116
As the world readied for the twenty-first century, so did this ever-growing
hacker culture. Between 2000 and 2005, Chinese hackers increased their
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dominance in the Asian world with continued attacks on Japan and Taiwan. The
majority of attacks stemmed from political motivations, and the number of hacker
groups increased as existing hacker groups grew in size.

Table 2- Chronological Timeline of Significant Hacker Attacks from China.
Year

Name of Attack

1998

Indonesian Riots

1999

1999

2000

2000
2001

2001

2004

2005

Cause

Chinese hackers assault webpages in
reaction to anti-Chinese
d.emonstrations in Indonesia
Taiwan’s “TwoRaids are initiated in opposition to
States”
Taiwanese webpages after the
country’s leader asserts that the
country is independent.
Chinese
Strikes against the United States’ sites
Embassy
commence after the Chinese Embassy
Bombing
is bombarded by U.S. forces.
Nanjing
Japanese webpages are hit after the
Massacre
Japanese administration is alleged to
Incident
refute its accountability in the Nanjing
Massacre.
Taiwan Voting
Hackers assault webpages after Chen
Episode
Shui-bian is voted as leader.
Assault on Japan Chinese groups attack Japanese
II
webpages for improper treatment of
Chinese citizens on an airline, poorly
manufactured cars from Japanese
company Mitsubishi, and Japanese
textbooks.
Sino-U.S. Hacker Chinese and American hackers attack
War
one another after an American spy
plane crashes into a Chinese fighter
jet, forcing the U.S. pilot to land on
Hainan.
Diaoyu Island
Individuals assault Japanese
Dispute
webpages in retaliation to Japanese
hacker attacks.
Yasukuni War
Webpages are vandalizes by Chinese
Memorial
hackers when Japan’s Prime Minister
Incident
journeys to the Yasukuni War
Memorial
81

Hacker War: US-China
Even to this day Chinese hackers have had a fondness for American
systems. If the Chinese embassy bombing planted the seeds of anti-American
actions, then the events in 2001 would be the sprouting of the tree. Hackers from
the U.S. and China conducted mass confrontations; much like the one fought
with the Taiwanese after a U.S. spy aircraft crashed into a Chinese military
aircraft and then made an emergency landing on the island of Hainan, which is
Chinese territory. The crew was detained for several days and then released.
These Sino-American attacks continued to escalate beyond the 2001
incidents. In 2003, hackers from China were able to steal information from
various U.S. government agencies. The group conducted wide-ranging assaults
in attempts to appropriate delicate intelligence as part of has now been
codenamed “Titan Rain.” The sheer scale, speed, and range was remarkable. On
November 1st, 2004, at 10:23 p.m. the attackers assaulted the U.S. Army
Information Systems Engineering Command in Arizona. Less than an hour later,
they used an identical weakness to attack the Defense Information Systems
Agency in Virginia. Five hours after the initial attack, the hackers struck again at
California’s Naval Ocean Systems Center. The last attack occurred just before 5
a.m. with the United States Army Space and Strategic Defense system.117
According to Alan Paller, the director of the SANS Institute which specializes in
information security and cybersecurity training, “From the Redstone Arsenal,
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home to the Army Aviation and Missile Command, the attackers grabbed specs
for the aviation mission-planning system for Army helicopters, as well as
Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air Force.”118
What makes these attacks more significant than previous ones is that military
systems are not connected to the internet directly, so these hackers needed to
bypass levels of security that far exceeds the previous actions of Chinese hacker
groups. Some of the other attacks on American systems include United Airlines,
United States Steel, and more famously, Westinghouse. Chinese targets
extended among every significant industry by 2012, when the director of the NSA
Keith Alexander designated cyber-espionage out of China as the “greatest
transfer of wealth in history.”119
It is clear from the foundations of the Chinese hacking community, as laid
out above, that it did not begin with strict governmental initiatives, but rather from
the spontaneous actions of an outraged citizenry, or “netizenry.” A coincidence of
events in the mid and late 1990s brought about an increasingly coherent
community of Chinese hackers with a clear theme of patriotism and nationalism
driving much of the community’s activity. While today it is very difficult to discern
the sources and motives for all Chinese hacks, these early foundations show that
Chinese hacking did not begin as the product of explicit governmental directives.
Rather, early Chinese “hacktivism” began in the grey area of spontaneous
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nationalist activity in defense of China’s international prestige as conceived by
China’s hackers.
However, the creation of Chinese hacking groups helps to convolute the
perception of the Chinese hacking landscape. While the foundations and growth
of these groups is indebted to political activism and an independent nature, the
rise of China’s economic progress during this era owes a great deal to statesponsored cyber-espionage. Due to a clash of these two ideologies, it can be
sometimes difficult to distinguish amongst the two. The question that the next few
chapters attempts to answer is just that, how can someone distinguish from what
is nationalistic independent action and what are state-sponsored cyber-attacks?
Hacker culture itself seems to be a mirror of the political system that has
made China into such a strong economic world power in the realm of
manufacturing. Much like a manufacturing system, an individual could write a
low-level computer code that is given to or sold to other individuals above them.
These secondary individuals might be contracted using these codes or may sell
them. These codes could even be placed on hacker webpages where individual
can download them or buy them for their own purposes.120 Because of this it is
sometimes very difficult to distinguish between who created the means of attack,
and who committed it. The attack might be traced back to the creator, who could
very well have no ties to the government, yet the perpetrator of the attack could
very well be a state-run organization. This very issue came up during my
discussion with the founder of HackRead. This notion also pertains to the idea
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that the attack is carried out by one individual and the information stolen is sold
to other and reduces the accuracy of recognizing the target. He states “The
Independent Chinese and Russian hackers are also sophisticated as they target
governments to steal documents and sell them to the government-backed
hackers (call them freelancers). I personally think that governments have no
problem with independent hackers and they actually like what these guys do,
there's always something important coming from these independent groups.”121
Later on in the same interview, he said “And like I said Chinese hackers don't
fear the government because the government knows one day they will get
something sensitive from these independent hackers.”122 This is very important in
understanding the way that attacks are carried out, because rarely are the means
of attack created by the attackers themselves. More commonly, a program or
virus is created by one individual or a small group and acquired by a larger
organization.
In the subsequent chapters, the different categorizations of Chinese
hackers will be outlined in one of three ways: independent, state-sponsored, and
freelance. It has become exceedingly difficult for experts and researchers to
separate the different groups because of the intricacies of the hacking culture as
well as the anonymity of the internet. There are significant differences between
the three classes, and therefore, it is possible to provide a view into the Chinese
hacking underworld.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
INDEPENDENT ACTORS
In China, there is some blurring of the line between patriotic hackers and
criminal hackers. There is also often uncertainty about whether a cyber-attack
has been launched by a military or government employee sitting at an office
desk, or by sympathetic unaffiliated civilians, or contracted civilians, or even by
independent civilians who are attacking for personal motivations such as financial
gain or notoriety. Due to the fact that the PRC has its hand in many aspects of
the economy entails that hackers have a tendency to come across government
jobs in their search for work. “I don’t think the West understands,” a former
Chinese hacker said. “China’s government is so big. It’s almost impossible to not
have any crossover with the government.”123 This striking statement is a good
point of departure for our examination of the different types of Chinese hackers,
starting with independent actors.
Independent hackers are more often than not motivated by money or
nationalism, but see themselves as lone sharks in a sea of governmentorchestrated agendas. The difference in China is that these individuals for the
most part have in mind what is best for their understanding of the Chinese
national good, which might involve direct support for the government, or a
broader understanding of Chinese national interest. Most often when Chinese
hackers are reported on in the world news, they may be an unit in the PLA or a
member of an independent nationalistic hacker group. Distinct from the hackers
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in the West, who typically are solitary or activists, individuals from China are
more concerned about political affairs and establishing the country as superior on
a global stage.
Independent, non-state sponsored hackers have deep roots in patriotism
and nationalism. These groups date back to the beginning of hacking in China,
with groups like ChinaWill, the Red Hacker Alliance, and the Green Army. There
is a strong relationship between these types of groups and Chinese identity and
Chinese culture and the country’s place in the world. According to journalist,
Edward Wong writing in the New York Times states that “the culture of hacking in
China is not confined to top-secret military compounds where hackers carry out
orders to pilfer data from foreign governments and corporations.” Furthermore,
hacking is a fixture of society that is blatantly deliberated about “at trade shows,
inside university classrooms and on internet forums.”124

Honker Union (1999/2001–Present)
Today, China’s most famous group of hackers, the Honker Union,
illustrates the grey area separating nationalistic actors and the state. The word
Honker is similar in nature to the term hongke, which literally means ‘red visitor’.
Founded in 2001, the group grew out of the cyber-warfare centered around the
Hainan spy plane incident of that year. Although some scholarship on the subject
has asserted that there is a link between the Honker Union and the Chinese
government, no specific details have been published. It is true that the hacking
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group’s actions are similar to the Party’s agenda, but in my assessment, this is
not enough to categorize a group as state-sponsored. Many patriotic hackers
perform actions that follow the same goals as the Communist Party. One of
Honker Union’s leaders, Lyon, has gone on the record saying, “The Honker
Union ... has no interest in getting involved in politics. We work only for the
security of Chinese websites.”125 Yet the same article concludes by stating that
Lyon is the head of a department in a major state-owned telecommunications
firm. The Honker Union has an established set of rules of engagement. To further
illustrate the way that the Honker Union operates and how their actions could
follow the same ideologies of the Party all one has to do it look at these rules of
engagement, which are found on their webpage and state the following:
1. Our offensive and defensive skills are not used to show off!
2. Out technology is to share with all patriotic Honkers!
3. We will continue to learn, and continually research new techniques of
attacks and defenses!
4. We must familiar [ourselves] with the C language, and any other
language of the target!
5. We must be patriotic!
6. We not only need to know the common exploits of the systems, but also
need to know how to discover exploits!
7. We must know how to use search engine, it is a very good tool for
learning!
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8. We must know how to break the conventional way of thinking! “Nothing
is impossible, if we can think of, then we can do it! There is no “room”
we cannot enter, if the “room” allows air to go in then we can become
“air” and go into the room!
9. We must know how to conduct oneself! – learning skills must first learn
how to conduct oneself!126
After the May 1999 event that say the embassy bombed in Yugoslavia, the
word “Honker” emerged within the hacking community. Since then, the
individuals whom this term illustrates have bended together within a collective
known as the Honker Union. These individuals unite their computer expertise
with nationalism. At the group’s inception, a series of attacks on websites in the
United States was initiated that illustrate this blending of skills and ideologies. At
the time of writing, there is no evidence that the Chinese government has any
affiliation with the group. The group mainly teaches and exchanges in
counterattack skills, and includes around fifty thousand members.
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Figure 10: Honker Union Attacks on Iranian Sites. A Honker Union attack on
Iranian web sites due to political motivations in 2010, and on an American web
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site.127
The New York Times indicates that hacking can also be a profitable
vocation in China, even if the individual does not work for the government. An
individual who has enough technological knowledge can utilize his or her abilities
to make one hundred thousand dollars per year in U.S. currency. Along with this,
it is the open culture and the view of hackers in China that contribute to such an
incredible phenomenon. Young individuals and students in China adore hackers.
They want to be them. In a study directed by the Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences, of the five thousand primary school students who were interviewed 43
percent answered that they “adored” hackers and 33 percent said they fantasized
of growing to be one in the future.128 Hacking in China is a lifestyle, an aspiration,
and a culture. It presents an autonomous avenue for the possibility of an
existence of their own desire, and not one that is controlled or regulated by the
government, family expectations, or cultural tradition. In response to the survey,
one student named Fan Yi said, “Hackers are very cool. Hackers leave people an
impression of high intelligence and are able to do whatever they like and get
whatever secrets they want. That is what I lack but dream of.”129
It is this view of hacker culture and the vast numbers who aspire to the
lifestyle and vocation of hacking that creates such a grey area where individuals
cannot be easily categorized. In the view of wishful individuals who aspire to
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become hackers, those who already are hackers seem to be able to do whatever
they want. They are a beacon of freedom and autonomy.
In 2008, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
organized an investigation into cyber threats originating from China. The
organization collected a wide range of security experts. The Commission’s report
established that “determining the origin of cyber operations, and attributing them
to the Chinese government or any other operator, is difficult. Computer network
operations provide a high degree of plausible deniability” to the Chinese
government.130
Online, an enthusiastic student can purchase all the tools of the trade,
from pre-programed Trojan horses to explanations of how to avoid or bypass
anti-virus programs. The market for malware in China includes many different
types of software, like the program Grey Pigeon. Grey Pigeon was initially
conceived to remotely control another user’s computer, and provided hackers
with an ideal tool. With this tool at their disposal, hackers are quickly able to
exploit any opening or system vulnerability. “Malware groups out of China have
been very quick to adopt zero-day exploits,” said Nart Villeneuve, chief research
officer at SecDev.Cyber. “They may be operating independently but there may be
some sort of market for selling the information that they get.”131 These zero-day
vulnerabilities are system weaknesses that exist without knowledge prior to an
Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Proliferation Practices, and
the Development of its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities,” May 2008 Accessed February
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incident; because the group that created it was not aware it existed. In 2008,
James Mulvenon, a prominent cyber-security expert, informed a congressional
commission that there are some individuals who receive instruction at institutions
specifically to become hackers or to learn to acquire confidential information
through computer activities, like the Communication Command Academy in
Wuhan for example.132

Red Hacker Alliance (1998-Present)
In 1998, individual hackers merged into what is known today as the Red
Hacker Alliance. This group still exists and has been a strong foundation for
Chinese hacking culture for almost twenty years at the time of writing. In 1999,
the bombardment of the United States Embassy in Yugoslavia brought together a
collection of nationalistic individuals in an attempt to defend their country against
what they saw as imperialism. Many of these individuals took the fight to
cyberspace in hacking efforts. These ‘red hackers’, as they were dubbed,
attacked any individual or group that they saw as critical of China, and infiltrated
other governments, organizations, and companies.
Following the wave of cyber-attacks related to the embassy bombing, the
group participated in a sequence of other assaults in opposition to specific
countries. They struck Taiwan in 1999 and yet again in 2000, the latter being in
connection to political elections. They also struck Japan in 2000 for events
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regarding the Nanjing Massacre in the Second World War. They assaulted the
country yet again in 2004, with strikes associated with the disagreements
regarding the Diaoyu Islands. When the U.S.-Sino hacking war broke out in
2001, the ‘Red Hackers’ sported approximately fifty thousand members. This
number can be a little inflated, because there is no telling the levels of expertise
that the majority of these members had. Many of these individuals knew little
about computer systems and only join based on patriotism and because group
membership does not require any technological knowledge. The group
maintained that their actions were only in and their only intention was to “defend
the national interests.”133 On the “Chinese hacker emergency meeting center”
webpage that was created in the midst of an attack, it was declared, “We firmly
support the position of the Chinese government and Communist Party of
China.”134

China Eagle and Wan Tao (2000-Dissolved)
The hacking group called China Eagle Union was founded in 2000. Over
the course of their short history they penetrated a vast amount of systems
ranging from American Government systems to Japanese personal
communication systems. Their actions consequently followed the PRC agenda, if
in a more aggressive and offensive manifestation than Beijing’s more diplomatic
language and cautious action. This group comprises of thousands of hackers
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whose declared objective is to penetrate western systems.135 Yet, founder Wan
Tao stresses that he on no occasion hacked legitimately for the government and
never stole confidential information. Other individuals affiliated with the group
maintain that the government has no contribution in their undertakings, and that
they are even defying the laws of the state which place them in jeopardy of
incarceration.136
Today, a lot of these individuals are instead searching for the prospect of
developing lawful security companies, or working legally within the security field.
Tao has been a fundamental role in this idea of hackers discovering legal means
for their skills in transforming the China Eagle Union into a NGO named the
Intelligence Defense Friends Laboratory. This organization was formed with the
intention to encourage more positive behavior for individuals who usually work
illegally for a living. In 2012, Tao also functioned as a managing consultant on
IBM's Cloud Tiger Team that markets IBM's cloud-based amenities. He stated
that the Chinese hacking population is not one of a well-oiled machine in which
gifted individuals are taken by the authorities and quickly incorporated into
malevolent operations. Quite the reverse, the community exists as a collection of
semi-skilled, self-taught individuals who are sometimes driven by nationalistic
spirits. Their intention is to create disorder in the form of cyber activism, while
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some merely seek to gain from their expertise.137

Javaphile and Coolswallow (2000-2008)
Javaphile was created in September 2000 by two individuals with the
online designations of “Coolswallow” and “blhuang”.138 The entire group is
thought to be students enrolled at Jiaotong University in Shanghai. Coolswallow
gained prominence during the 2001 EP-3 incident. Coolswallow and blhuang
would later reorganize the group into a full-fledged hacker group as well as a
creating a web site offering their services. The group gained some notoriety in
2002 for vandalizing a Taiwanese company’s webpage, Lite-On.
Although its more significant members are also members of the Red
Hacker Alliance, there is a noteworthy difference between the two groups. Site
defacement is very common between the two groups. This can be seen in the
attacks on the websites Lite-On and Fox T.V., as the graphics and language is
not typical when compared to that of a Red Hacker Alliance attack. The group
appears to be more religious-based than that of the common Chinese hacking
groups as their homepage displays an image of a Buddha head. Coolswallow
came out in the open under his own name in 2008 after publishing several
academic articles on cyber-espionage. Peng Yinan, also known as Coolswallow,
presently is performing research for the Chinese government. Since his work as
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Coolswallow, Peng has worked as a security information consultant for the
Shanghai Public Security Bureau, which highlights the relationship that some
hackers have in state-run organizations. Public Security Bureaus in the nation
are similar to police agencies and act as the principle police and security
authority for the People’s Republic of China.

Figure 11: Message From Javaphile After Taiwan Attack. A message left by the
group Javaphile after an attack on the nation-state of Taiwan.140
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Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) and Wicked Rose
The Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) group is culpable for the
creation and distribution of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel’s
structure code. NCPH consists of approximately ten members, including
individuals with the usernames “Wicked Rose,” “KuNgBiM,” “Rodag,” and
“Charles.”141 Attacks by the group were first published on May 18, 2006. The
group became well regarded due to their use of zero-day vulnerabilities. The first
sign was discovered when the Internet Storm Center reported a potential zeroday attack on May 18, 2006. The attacks started six days prior on May 12 and
were discovered to be attacks on establishments in the U.S. and in Japan, two
common cyber-enemies of Chinese hackers.
Wicked Rose is the most significant among the group’s members, as well
as the one who is most public. An early twenty-year old college student studying
at Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, it is through Wicked Rose that
the other members can be ascertained.142 The group is more than likely other
students at the university who form a close social circle and support each other’s
hacking interests. Throughout the summer of 2006, while the school was not in
active session, over thirty five zero-day vulnerabilities and assaults on previously
undiscovered Microsoft Office vulnerabilities were exposed.143
Wicked Rose turned out to be an individual by the name of Tan Dailin. He
was arrested by local authorities in Chengdu, China in 2009 due to new Chinese
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cybercrime laws that were passed that same year. Tan was allegedly detailed
after a discovered DDOS attack in which his victims went to the authorities with
proof of his actions.144 There are significant dangers in hacking independently,
especially now that cyber-attacks originating from Asia are gaining and
international audience. China itself has passed legislation protecting public
systems, which is a contrast to past legislation that merely protected government
systems. In 2011, the PRC revised its Regulations on the Protection of Computer
Information System Security of the PRC, and in 2012 the Decision of the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee on Strengthening the Protection of
Internet Information was passed.145 Both of these allowed for the crack down on
cyber-attacks within the country. Individuals like Tan would find that the watchful
eyes of the Chinese government would no longer turn a blind eye to the actions
of hackers and hacktivists. Hackers would now face harsher punishment for their
actions, especially if Chinese systems were the victims.
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Figure 12: Wicked Rose, Leader of NCPH. Wicked Rose turned out to be a
college student named Tan Dailin.146
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Figure 13: The Hacker Studio. Members of NCPH operating in their “Hacker
studio”. 147
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CHAPTER FIVE:
STATE-SPONSORED GROUPS
Efforts by individuals or groups from China to pilfer vital information from
western organizations and businesses have been well- documented. These
successful or foiled attacks have caused frequent hostilities amongst the United
States and China in recent years. Cyber-security authorities and prominent
organizations whose services exist online, like Google and Microsoft, have
upheld that Chinese individuals employ cyber-attacks to take vital information
from many significant sectors of society. In the face of these accusations,
Chinese representatives have routinely rejected assertions that the PRC and
PLA are sponsors to cyber-attacks on western establishments. Representatives
also reject the allegations that the PLA has the competency and abilities to
assault the infrastructure and systems of other nations. In a proclamation in
2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “the Chinese government does not
engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it encourage or
support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way.” He also
asserted, “Cybertheft of commercial secrets and hacking attacks against
government networks are both illegal; such acts are criminal offenses and should
be punished according to law and relevant international conventions.” 148 There
are specific laws created by the PRC to battle cybercrime in the nation:
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Table 3: Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China
Definition149

Article Number
285

286

Whoever violates state regulations and intrudes into
computer systems within formation concerning state affairs,
construction of defense facilities, and sophisticated science
and technology is be sentenced to not more than three years
of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention.
Whoever violates states regulations and deletes, alters,
adds, and interferes in computer information systems,
causing abnormal operations of the systems and grave
consequences, is to be sentenced to not more than five
years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention; when
the consequences are particularly serious, the sentence is to
be not less than five years of fixed-term imprisonment.
Whoever violates state regulations and deletes, alters, or
adds the data or application programs installed in or
processed and transmitted by the computer systems, and
causes grave consequences, is to be punished according to
the preceding paragraph.
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Whoever deliberately creates and propagates computer
virus and other programs which sabotage the normal
operation of the computer system and cause grave
consequences is to be punished according to the first
paragraph.
Whoever uses a computer for financial fraud, theft,
corruption, misappropriation of public funds, stealing state
secrets, or other crimes is to be convicted and punished
according to relevant regulations of this law.

However, there are hacker collections that exhibit connections to the PRC
and/or government-run organizations, and individuals from China’s hacking
underworld have publically affirmed that they or a group that they were members
of are now or at one point were sponsored by the state. United States security
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firms have also published research on hacking groups that that link them to the
Chinese government, like Mandiant and FireEye for example.150 On top of all
this, there also exists official government documents issued by the Chinese
government that confirms that the People’s Liberation Army has cyber-defense
and warfare divisions.
While many media sources, like the Washington Times, continuously
accuse the Chinese Communist Party for the bulk of attacks emanating from
Asia, the party adamantly renounces these assertions. For example, hundreds of
executive officers in Great Britain received messages from the chief of the British
Secret Service informing them that they had fallen victim to cyber-attacks from
the Chinese government.151 Party representatives allege that these assailants
are either other governments feigning to be China, non-governmental sanctioned
hackers, or the attacks themselves are fabrications created by anti-Chinese
factions in the United States and Western Europe.

The Science of Military Strategy and the Role of the Party
There has been acknowledgement from the Chinese government itself
that it has been developing and plans to further its cyber-capabilities. According
to Joe McReynolds at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, the
newest issue of The Science of Military Strategy is confirmation of these cybercapabilities. Because it is disseminated by the PLA itself, the publication is
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meticulously studied by many western experts.152 It provides the leading
examination of the function of the Chinese government in cyber-crime, as well as
the Communist party’s position on hacking. The Science of Military Strategy is
produced “once in a generation,” McReynolds said, and “is the first time we’ve
seen an explicit acknowledgement of the existence of China’s secretive cyberwarfare forces from the Chinese side”.153
There is a fundamental cultural difference that might significantly
contribute to both the direct and indirect relationship between the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese hackers. According to the interview
performed with the member of Anonymous Serbia, he believes that foreign policy
and hacking can be related. According to him, “countries like China don't have to
be worried about answering to their own public, so they tend to lead, on the
surface, at least, more offensive foreign policy. Nowadays, hacking is part of that
foreign policy.”154 Normally, Western nations do not require its non-governmental
citizens to attempt to collect information of any kind on the government’s behalf
while in peacetime. Most other nations do not seem to participate in the types of
actions that Chinese hackers are involved in. These activities, according to some
observers, move far past intelligence-gathering, and into a much more malicious
territory. The CCP does not make a differentiation between these two
responsibilities, because its citizens are supposed to openly participate in actions
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that further the growth of the nation. McReynolds wrote that the publication has a
tendency to “focus heavily on the central role of peacetime ‘network
reconnaissance’ — that is, the technical penetration and monitoring of an
adversary’s networks — in developing the PLA’s ability to engage in wartime
network operations.”155 According to McReynolds, the People’s Liberation Army
does not see the same types of distinctions as its Western counterparts in
military and civilian roles, and their philosophy for future conflicts even muddles
these views further:
In the high-tech local war which we will face in the future, the role of the
masses as the main body of the war is embodied by the country. The
great power of the people’s war is released through comprehensive
national power, the combination of peace time and war time, the
combinations of the military and the civilian, and the combination of war
actions and non-war actions. Besides the direct participation and
cooperation with the army’s operations in the region where war happens,
the masses will support the war mainly by political, economic, technical,
cultural and moral means.156
There is another arena where the Chinese system differs from Western
practices and that is corporate espionage. Much like the PLA’s ideologies in
intelligence gathering, gathering trade secrets falls under the same umbrella of
intelligence gathering for the sake of national-growth. Due to its nominally
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communist nature, the PRC does not make the distinguishment from the nation’s
domestic production, and all of the country’s possessions and resources are
regarded as property of the Chinese people. Money, banking, and other financial
organization usually comprise one of the pillars of society and are vital for the
maintaining stability. This ranks even higher than that of the development of
military capabilities, as a weak financial base makes military growth futile. For a
growing society like the PRC, which seeks to enhance its military might, the PRC
must first develop a strong financial base. So with this in mind, hacking attempts
that support the promotion of government initiatives, whether state-sponsored or
independent, would be seen as beneficial and more likely to be allowed to
continue by officials. In a 2002 official warning from Taiwanese police for
example, it stated that “some 300,000-plus hackers in China who break into hightech companies around the world and steal confidential information and
programs, with the tacit consent of the Chinese government.”157 Also evaluating
this topic, iSight Chief Executive, John Watters has said “Nothing suggests that
Chinese authorities are vigilantly prosecuting those who are attacking foreign
interests. They turn a blind eye to it as long as it doesn’t oppose national
interests.”158 One reason for these types of actions by the government revolves
around the country’s increasing energy requirements, as the Chinese
government finds itself under greater pressures to sustain its economic
momentum as it moves into the future, they must acquire stability in their energy
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resources. Chinese hackers, whether working for personal gain or as state
operatives, are finding that the exchange of information associated with the
petroleum and energy industries are extremely profitable and/or extremely
important to the growth of the Chinese state. So out of either a nationalistic
viewpoint or financial gain, Chinese hackers are finding that the government is
more apt to turn a blind eye to these types of practices or even facilitating the
hacks themselves.
These types of attacks span more than a decade and are not only easily
recognized but can also be readily researched. Much like many media outlets,
researchers find the prospect of state-sponsored hacker groups very interesting.
In 2004, Shawn Carpenter, an expert at Sandia National Laboratories managed
to uncover a sizable cyber-espionage organization with links to known statesponsored hackers in China’s Guangdong Province. These hackers were given
the alias “Titan Rain” by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Like stated before,
the attackers behind Titan Rain assaulted hundreds of systems in a single night.

PLA Unit 61398: Advanced Persistent Threat 1
A recent publication issued by the American cyber-security firm Mandiant
exposes a group based out of Shanghai and the shocking history of hacking and
cyber-theft linked to it. Mandiant argues that this group of hackers is Chinese
military-based, with specific connections to the PLA. Since 2004, Mandiant
(which has since been purchased by FireEye) has researched cyber-security
penetrations at organizations globally. They dub this individual group APT1, and
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proclaim that it is one of more than 20 “advanced persistent threat” or APT
groups that originate from China. The firm witnessed the Chinese group break
into over a hundred computer systems belonging to Western government
institutions and corporations. According to the publication, “though our visibility of
APT1’s activities is incomplete, we have analyzed the group’s intrusions against
nearly 150 victims over seven years.”159 This group is believed to be the Second
Bureau of the PLA’s General Staff Department’s Third Department, which is
usually recognized by the military label “Unit 61398.”

Figure 14: Unit 61398 Activity. The first shows the activity of the PLA group that
is accused of attacking American systems.
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Figure 15: Cyber-Attacks Performed by APT1.160

Throughout Mandiant’s investigation, APT1 besieged almost two dozen
industries, paying special consideration to areas that could be deemed as crucial
to the Chinese government and state, like technology and military for example.
The evidence that Mandiant has compiled linking this hacker group to the
Chinese military is extraordinary. The key is in the location of Unit 61398’s
headquarters. Military Unit 61398 is located in the Shanghai’s Pudong New Area,
and their station itself is a facility twelve floors high built in 2007. The group’s
undertakings have been traced by the security organization to Shanghai
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networks, with two of the four found being located in the same area as Unit
61398 base of operations. Ninety-eight percent of the IP (Internet Protocol)
addresses used by APT1 were traced back to China, and 99.8 percent of the
HTRAN communication IP addresses were registered to the Shanghai
networks.161 IP addresses are used to identify a device while on a network like
the internet. Through the use of IP addresses, three individual hackers
(“UglyGorilla,” “DOTA,” and “SuperHard”) were traced both to APT1 and the
Pudong area, each with very detailed links.162 HTRAN communication IP
addresses are proxy server addresses used to mask a host’s address. Even after
the report’s publication, the Chinese government denied any wrongdoing. In
response, a government webpage asserted that many of these attacks were
performed using commandeered IP addresses and that IP addresses are very
misleading.163
In 2013, The U.S. Department of Defense openly accused Chinese statesponsored hacking groups of attacking and extracting information from United
States civilians, government, military, and businesses. The founder of security
firm Ivincea, Anup Ghosh, added “the acknowledgement by the Pentagon is a
first step in publicly declaring the threat.” This comes more than a year after the
United States Justice Department officially indicted five military officials from
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China for breaking into the systems of American corporations and pilfering
exclusive records and documents. American prosecutors revealed that the group
had stolen trade secrets from five businesses as well as a labor union. “The
alleged hacking appears to have been conducted for no reason other than to
advantage state-owned companies and other interests in China, at the expense
of businesses here in the United States,” attorney general Eric Holder said in a
dramatic press conference that included posters of the five individuals.164 In
response, Qin Gang of the foreign ministry replied that the accusations were
“made up” and could very much “damage Sino-American co-operation and
mutual trust” if the charges stood. He would go on to state that “China is a
staunch defender of network security, and the Chinese government, military and
associated personnel have never engaged in online theft of trade secrets.”165 The
alleged conspirators were all known members of the PLA’s Unit 61398. Speaking
on behalf of the PRC, Qin Gang of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proclaimed the
the arrests are “based on fabricated facts,” and that “China is steadfast in
upholding cyber security. The Chinese government, the Chinese military and
their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft or
trade secrets.”166
While if the previously mentioned PLA unit indeed is in operation, it
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performs its tasks in the shadows, that does not mean that there are no other
cyber divisions within the PLA or the government. Quite the contrary, in February
2014, President Xi Jingpin announced the establishment of a group named the
Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group.167 The group exists
as an information security organization, and is led prominent individuals like Lu
Wei (who also heads the Party’s Cyberspace Administration).168 Both the military
unit within the PLA and the group led by Lu Wei show that both the Party and the
military are very concerned about the country’s cyber-capabilities, and are
beginning to move within sight of the international community.

Operation Shady Rat (2006-2010)
In 2005 and 2006 a group attacked a total of seventy-two organizations,
corporations, and governments, as well as the International Olympic Committee.
Over fourteen different countries were victims, and it was one of the largest
hacking operations ever at that time. Having been blamed for attacks on the IMF
and Sony, the media and many experts pointed the finger at the Chinese
government. Dmitri Aplerovich, vice president of McAfee securities said that “This
is the biggest transfer of wealth in terms of intellectual property in history. The
scale at which this is occurring is really, really frightening, we were surprised by
the enormous diversity of the victim organizations and were taken aback by the
audacity of the perpetrators.” The operation gained its name from the tools used
in the attack: remote access tools (RAT).
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Recognized as one of the biggest chains of cyber-attacks since the rise of
hackers, McAfee securities unraveled in 2014 what they dubbed “Operation
Shady Rat.” Using common spear-phishing tactics, systems that are attacked are
bombarded with personal communications (usually emails) that are sent to
people within. Once the file is opened malware is downloaded onto the victims
computer and the file is opened. Once opened a program will initiate and exploit
whatever the hackers are trying to do. The targets are found in many locations
globally. McAfee revealed that the systems are penetrated using “obfuscated or
encrypted HTML comments embedded in otherwise benign websites, in order to
indirectly control compromised endpoints,” FireEye securities added that this type
of method is linked to a collection identified as “Comment Group”, who is
assumed to be connected to either the PRC or the PLA.169
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Figure 16: Shady Rat Phishing Attack.170

Operation Aurora (2009-2010)
Discovered in late 2009, this operation was a high-profile attack against
Google and linked directly by security expert Brian Krebs to the Chinese
government.171 Operation Aurora takes its name due to the fact that attackers
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utilized the Aurora Trojan horse program. Attackers used a database of Gmail
accounts accumulated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and law
enforcement agencies. “In mid-December [2009], we detected a highly
sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from
China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google,” said an
online message by Google’s chief legal officer, David Drummond. Nevertheless,
Google stated that the incident affected “at least twenty other large companies
from a wide range of businesses – including the Internet, finance, technology,
media and chemical sectors – have been similarly targeted.”172 Chinese IP
addresses were uncovered as the main servers in the attacks as the source
servers in the attacks, and Symantec securities linked the Chinese hacker group
Hidden Lynx to the attacks. Another reason the attacks are believed to be
Chinese in origin is because much of the programing in the attacks is written
using Chinese tools and with Chinese code.173 Because the region of origin for
the attacks was traced back to Chinese servers and the code itself was created
using distinct Chinese computer code, it is not uncalled for for these security
experts to blame Chinese individuals or groups for these attacks.
Experts believe that the attacks from Aurora originated from Shanghai
Jiaotong University and the Lanxiang Vocational School in the Shandong
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province.174 On the other hand, Chinese authorities both within the government
as well as with the universities have denied any wrongdoing. Li Zixiang with the
Lanxiang school even formally stated that “investigations …found no trace the
attacks originated from our school.”175 Rong Lanxiang, the founder of the
Lanxiang School made a public statement in which he said “The report (by The
New York Times) is merely a fabrication. We do have students joining the PLA,
but it is part of the national policy of military recruitment. Our computing center
has more than 2000 computers, but this fact has nothing to do with Baidu. [The
report] said we have a military background, this is a joke.”176

Deep Panda (2011-2015)
Between 2011 and 2015, a group that went by many different names
attacked various high profile organizations in one of the greatest acts of cyberespionage ever. Also known as Shell Crew,” the group has been linked to attacks
on the health care providers Anthem, and Premera, in addition to the U.S. Office
of Personnel Management. The penetration of data on the health care providers
resulted in the theft of the financial and medical records of approximately eleven
million individuals. The group’s activities were first seen in 2011 with smaller
attacks on the American and Japanese organizations related to infrastructure. It
was named “Deep Panda” due to its links to China.
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Figure 17: A FBI Alert for Deep Panda. A email alert sent to all members of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation about the security issues brought forth by the
Deep Panda attacks.177
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Figure 18: Logo and Calling Card for Deep Panda. The logo for Deep Panda as it
left on sites as a calling card on websites after an attack.178

Operation Poisoned Hurricane (2014)
First discovered in early 2014, this group targeted several internet service
providers, government organizations, an American media company, and a
financial institution. The hackers used malware that was connected to websites
like adobe.com and outlook.com, but individuals were re-routed to pages that
hackers had set up to look legitimate. Security firm FireEye identified twenty-one
websites that were hijacked this way.
All twenty-one websites were configured using the same internet service,
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Hurricane Electric’s public DNS (domain name service) service, meaning that all
twenty-one sites were run by the same organization. FireEye believes that the
targets were involved in the Hong Kong democracy protests. The People’s
Republic of China is the being in all likelihood to be concerned with attaining this
goal.179 The attack was given its name because the system attacked belonged to
a corporation called Hurricane Electric. The cyber-security firm FireEye tracked
the operation and published their findings. In their conclusions they state that
they observed “the use of Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to redirect
command and control traffic.” They also state that “the fact that the malware
appears to beacon to legitimate domains may lull defenders into a false sense of
security.”180

Emissary Panda (2015-Present)
In 2015, the Emissary Panda group targeted a wide range of organizations
involved in defense manufacturing and international relations. Also known as TG3390, the websites compromised by the group were connected with five diverse
establishments, which industrial firms, predominantly those providing to the
sector of defense; U.S. embassies involved in international relations; government
organizations; energy enterprises; and several non-government organizations
(NGOs). Based on this information, researchers with Dell SecureWorks Counter

179

Kovacs, Eduard. "APT Group Hijacks Popular Domains to Mask C&C Communications:
FireEye." Security Week. August 6, 2014. Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://www.securityweek.com/apt-group-hijacks-popular-domains-mask-cc-communicationsfireeye
180 Homan, Joshua, Mike Scott, and Ned Moran. "Operation Poisoned Hurricane." Threat
Research Blog. FireEye, August 6, 2014. Accessed April 23, 2016.
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/operation-poisoned-hurricane.html

120

Threat Unit believe that the group’s objective was to gather information pertaining
to defense, manufacturing data and blueprints, and vital information found in
government and NGO systems.181

Figure 19: Emissary Panda Attacks 2015. Amount of attacks per week by the
Emissary Panda group between July 13 and August 10, 2015.182

Wekby (2015)
Also known as APT 18, Dynamite Panda, and TG-0416, this group stole
four and a half million patient records from Community Health Systems in 2015.
Using a method that is shown to be very familiar to Chinese hackers, spearphishing emails were sent that were titled “Important: Flash Update” to company
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personnel. The hackers used a zero-day attack using Adobe Flash Player code.
The emails contained a link that led the readers to an apparently official
download page. Those who clicked on the link downloaded a malicious file
containing malware. “This group typically targets companies in the aerospace
and defense, construction and engineering, technology, financial services, and
healthcare industry verticals,” said Charles Carmakal, managing director at
Mandiant securities “The attacker has been known to steal intellectual property
related to medical technology and pharmaceutical manufacturing processes.”183

183

Mimoso, Michael. "APT Gang Branches Out to Medical Espionage in Community Health
Breach." Threatpost The First Stop for Security News. August 19, 2014. November 17, 2015.
https://threatpost.com/apt-gang-branches-out-to-medical-espionage-in-community-healthbreach/107828/

122

Figure 20: Wekby Phishing Attack184
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CHAPTER SIX:
FREELANCE ACTORS, THE GREY AREA
As with everything in this world, hackers in China do not exist in a world of
simple black and white. There are grey areas between that cannot be defined in
such polarized categories. In the world of Chinese hacking, there are groups and
individuals that move between the lines separating independent actors and statesponsored agents. These individuals are best described as freelance actors.
They are those who render their services to the highest bidder, even if that bidder
is the Chinese government. There are groups that at one moment carry out
attacks that are significantly linked to the Chinese government, and then
performing attacks with no link at all to the government. Due to the fluid
allegiances of these groups, it is sometimes difficult to unravel the motivations for
their attacks.
Wan Tao, one of China’s first nationalistic hackers believes that there is
another separate group of hackers that he labeled “underground hackers.” They
are best described as black-market operatives who peddle their unique abilities
or act on their own volition in order to increase their reputation in hopes of
expanding their business opportunities. “Their business model is to sell,” 185 Wan
declares. He provides his own experiences as a prominent hacker as proof. As a
member of the prominent hacking group, the “Green Army,” he e-mail bombed
the Japanese prime minister in 1997 and conducted many attacks on U.S.
webpages after the 2001 EP-3 incident. He acted on his own initiative and not as
185

"Masters of the Cyber-universe." The Economist. April 6, 2013. December 13, 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574636-chinas-state-sponsored-hackers-areubiquitousand-totally-unabashed-masters

124

an agent of the Communist party. Yet, as his reputation grew he was solicited to
offer his skills.
While attending a security conference in Guangzhou in 1998, Wan was
approached by law enforcement seeking his assistance. He designed a software
system in order for law enforcement to ascertain the authors of anonymous
postings on webpage bulletin boards. “I’m a security expert,” he explains. “They
had the need.” He was later approached by the PLA for assistance, but he
declined to help. He did instead help recruit other hackers into their services.
When anti-Japanese riots shook China in 2005, the Communist Party worked to
mute the same nationalistic attitude it had nurtured for so many years. Wan Tao
was at one time free to attack non-nationals online, and then he was commanded
by the powers that be to remove seditious substance from his personal website.
“I thought I had freedom online,” says Wan. “But I was wrong.” 186
Wan’s story did in fact come full circle. In 2011 and 2012, cyber-crime
skyrocketed in China. According to official statistics, approximately 260 million
Chinese were victims of cyber-attacks during this time.187 Those who were once
motivated by nationalistic and patriotic causes where lured into illegality by
financial motivations. In response, Chinese authorities fought back against cybercrime within their borders. The man who was once approached by the PLA for
assistance was jailed. No longer in jail and working as a cybersecurity consultant,
he stresses that at no time provided he provide hacking services to the Chinese
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government.
Wan Tao’s story is the perfect example of the fluidity of hacking culture in
China. At any point, many Chinese hackers could be classified under any of the
three categorizations (independent, state-sponsored, freelance). Much like every
other job, hacking can be all about profit. This is not always the case, but it is a
strong motivation nonetheless. During a speech, the Guangdong Province
governor Lu Ruihua, stated “as long as they [Chinese hackers] do not break the
law, there is no loss, regarding the master hacker; we can send them a thousand
dollars a month to support them! Some sectors of the system are not easy to find
vulnerabilities; why cannot I use the hacker’s knowledge and skills.”188 It is under
these circumstances where normally independent actors can become agents of
the state, either on a short-term or long-term basis.
Much like that of an independent actor, nationalism can be a large
motivation for why Chinese hackers blur the line between independent and statesponsored. Over the past few generations, China has been battling to regain its
power on the global stage. When examining freelance Chinese hackers, it is
important to know that Chinese nationalism, in the view of many, is especially
concerned with returning the nation to its previous glory. It is not entirely about
conflict with the west or the US, though this is a part of that impetus. As stated
before, the majority of Chinese hackers are young (many are of college age) and
can be fanatical about topics that affect their nation’s global image and standing.
From the earliest days of the Chinese hacking scene, many attacks emanating
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from China have been politically fueled and are commonly a means to protest
against actions or perceived stances of foreign countries. However, as significant
as nationalistic motivations are, monetary motivations seem to be becoming
almost as important. Many companies and organizations are taking advantage of
this, including the Chinese government. There are a significant number of
patriotic hackers that steal commercial secrets with the intention of selling them
to the highest bidder, which in some cases could be the government.

Yujun Yumin
Recently, as a segment of its effort to improve and develop the PLA, the
government has wanted to extract its assets located in the citizen populace. In
2003, the PLA declared the program of yujun yumin, or in discovering military
aptitude within its population.189 Consequently, ascertaining where the
government concludes and the public commences is becoming a progressively
difficult task, as has been an ongoing challenge throughout this study. Exploiting
enemy weakness to overcome relative deficits in strength has been central to
Chinese military planning as far back as the early Han dynasty, and was central
to Mao Zedong’s theory of guerrilla warfare. Unrestricted Warfare, a book
published in 1999 by the People’s Liberation Army, applies this longstanding
approach to modern informational and cyber warfare, suggesting that the blurred
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lines examined throughout this paper are there by design.190
Sometimes the Chinese government calls upon its people to act for the
government. Other times hackers aid in fulfilling or completing the government’s
agenda purely by following their own nationalistic ideals. A member of the
Chinese hacking group “Honker Union,” codenamed “Prince,” also provides a
good example of this and the experiences of a freelance hacker. “Prince” has
gone on record saying that the group’s actions, as well as the individuals
themselves, are strictly based on nationalistic agendas. “We never proactively
launch attacks for no reason. We only do it when China’s national interest is
harmed,” he said. “In most of the cases, we just fight back.”191
He says the hackers act on their own but that occasionally they are called
on by the government to help track those believed to be working against the
state. “I independently have some cooperation with the Chinese government but
it’s all off the record,” he said. “The government normally asks me to follow the
electronic footprint of different hackers, gather information on hackers, and
ultimately submit official reports.”192
We should note that this kind of activity is certainly not restricted to China.
There are examples of this within the United States. In 1997, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation sought to test how vulnerable America’s networks were by hiring
outside hackers to attack their own systems. They employed “a team of eccentric
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computer geniuses who occasionally helped out with law enforcement
investigations and who called themselves ‘The L0pht.’”193 They could break
passwords stored in any operating system. They could decrypt any satellite
communications. They even created software that could hack into someone’s
computer and control it remotely, spying on the user’s every keystroke, changing
the user’s files, kick the user off the internet, or send the user to any site of their
choosing.194 The group was even brought to Capitol Hill on May 19, 1998 to
testify about the status of the internet. This group operated in whatever capacity
suited them best, and in this case just so happened to work in concert with a
government agency to do what they did best, and that was hack.

GhostNet (2006–2009)
GhostNet was a cyber-espionage operation that penetrated computers
and stole records from many international governments and public organizations.
The system used by the attackers corrupted systems with a Trojan horse
branded “gh0st RAT”, which granted them comprehensive, instantaneous
command of the system. The gh0st RAT malware has been linked to China’s
Hainan Province. Ultimately, there existed a network of approximately 1,300
contaminated systems in over 100 nations. In addition, approximately 30 percent
of these systems were deemed as highly importance victims . These systems
encompassed several departments of international affairs, international
businesses, embassies, and media outlets. Christened GhostNet, this cluster of
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systems was centered on Asian governments.
Gh0st RAT was capable of seizing complete influence of contaminated
systems, and was able to explore and take particular documents, as well as
secretly controlling devices like cameras. When asked about the government of
China’s involvement, Wenqi Gao a spokeman for the Chinese Consulate in New
York rejected the notion that it was implicated. “These are old stories and they
are nonsense,” Gao said. “The Chinese government is opposed to and strictly
forbids any cybercrime.”195

Hidden Lynx (2009–2012?)
In February 2013, a security company named Bit9 which is now known as
Carbon Black Inc, issued a proclamation divulging that a recognized collection
titled “Hidden Lynx” was able to breach the company’s system. The group is an
expert group of assailants with sophisticated skills. The group has existed ever
since 2009, and is almost certainly a group that its skills in exchange for financial
gain. Many of the attacks linked to this group involve the retrieval of information,
and the targets are a significant arrangement of businesses and governments.
The collection utilizes innovative methods, separating them from other hacking
organizations. According to security firm Symantec, Hidden Lynx is a good-sized
group consisting of between at most 100 people.
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Black Vine (2012–2014)
In early 2014, the biggest healthcare data breach ever occurred on one of
the largest health insurers in the United States, Anthem. The Anthem breach
began in May 2014 when the company was contaminated with a malicious
program called Mivast. The breach was not discovered until February of 2015,
almost a year after it had commenced. The invaders stole the records and
confidential information of millions of individuals. Symantec’s report on Operation
Aurora also offered evidence linking the same group to a China-based IT security
company known as Topsec, which also happens to be funded by the
government. 196
Like I stated earlier, the world of Chinese hacking does not exist purely in
blacks and whites. There are groups like Hidden Lynx and individuals like Wan
Tao that move between the classifications of independent and state-sponsored
agents. They are those who are likely to be motivated by financial means and are
the most likely to sell their services to the highest bidder. Wan Tao, for example,
has gone on record stating that independently he has helped the government
track individuals and do other services. Black Vine, on the other hand, has been
directly linked to the organization TopSec, which is a state-run group. These
hackers are the ones that make it most difficult to make classifications of the
Chinese hacking culture.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CYBER-CRIME AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
The topic of cyber-crime is extraordinarily important in a world where
online activities encompass the most essential facets of our lives. U.S. officials
even alerted President Barack Obama that China had hacked into his campaign
computer systems, gaining access to position papers, finances, and emails.
Obama had decided later to confront the Chinese directly on their rampant
penetrations of U.S. computer networks. On March 11, 2013, President Obama’s
National Security Consultant Thomas Donilon, presented at the New York Asia
Society. At the event he said that American corporations were more and more
apprehensive “about sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business
information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating
from China on an unprecedented scale.”197
The subject of Chinese cyber-attacks is a moderately new field owing to
the modern expansion of the phenomenon. However, international concerns
about hacking as a whole are not. In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly
approved computer crime laws. Key nations began forming approaches and
doctrines to battle online crime and defend information as early as 1997. At the
turn of the century, regulations and procedures were established internationally
throughout the global community. Countless countries have created legislation
with defense and prosecution of cybercrimes in mind. Many researchers and
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academics had become attracted to the fields of cybercrime, the internet, and
cyberespionage as information was easily accessible.

A Borderless Crime
Many computer crimes are transnational, meaning that they cross borders
and jurisdictions. A cybercrime can be committed in one country with a victim in
another country, thousands of miles away. Because every nation is connected to
the Internet, cybercriminals can commit offenses from anywhere, and victims can
be anywhere. Moreover, offenders can be very mobile, moving from one place to
the next very quickly if needed. Hackers can physically operate in one country,
easily access data on computers located in a different continent, and then move
to another location to evade law enforcement. The borderless nature of
cybercrime also means that any nation can be targeted and its citizens victimized
from anywhere in the world. This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for law
enforcement to determine the country in which the crime was actually committed
and then to locate the specific offender. If an offender is found, it may be unclear
what agency should have jurisdiction to adjudicate the offense. To fix this issue,
the United Nations has developed legislature to combat cybercrime. In 2000, the
organization passed Resolution 55/64, which includes:

(a) States should ensure that their laws and practice eliminate safe
havens for those who criminally misuse information technologies.
(d) Legal systems should protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
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availability of data and computer systems from unauthorized impairment
and ensure that criminal abuse is penalized.198

In order for transnational crimes to be prosecuted, there has to be two
kinds of jurisdiction: substantive and investigative. Both of these are required for
cases of transnational cyber-crimes. States must be able to uphold that their
systems of criminal law utilized be applied to the case in question. It is important
that a nation’s laws can be applied to cases that take place partly within its
territories, or even outside their territory. In the case of cybercrime and internet
crimes, this can be tricky because these forms are global in scope. Additionally, it
needs to be seen if these nations have the legal ability to carry out investigative
actions that concern the territories of other states. In many of these cases,
international cooperation is required. In order to provide for cases such as cybercrime, multilateral and bilateral levels of international treaty laws are created, as
well as national laws that form the basis for an individual nation’s cooperation.

Creation of International Laws
As a result of the mounting danger of worldwide cybercrime and the
political and legal complications in organizing law enforcement that can traverse
international lines, numerous endeavors have been created to enable and assist
collaboration amongst nations. One of the earliest and more important attempts
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the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime.199 The treaty has remained
an issue of considerable deliberation by the European Union since as early as
1997. The objective of the convention was seen as an effort to “harmonize laws
against malicious hacking, virus writing, fraud and child pornography on the net.
It also aims to ensure that police forces in separate countries gather the same
standard of evidence to help track and catch criminals across borders.”200 Since
cybercrime often has a tendency to transcend an individual nation’s borders, the
measures to combat it must also of course be of an international nature.
The treaty’s contents are a great example of international legislation that
pertains to computer-based crimes. Articles 2 through 11 of the Treaty
accomplish the goal of prohibiting specific types of conduct.201 Each nation that
endorses the treaty is expected to agree upon specified criminal offenses and the
associated consequences for crimes perpetrated within that nation, the territories
in their possession, on a state’s vessel or aircraft, or by their citizens when they
are in a foreign country. The offenses are categorized in four areas of crime:
scam and counterfeiting, child pornography, intellectual property, and computer
system intrusion or hacking. Other articles in the treaty establish a legal
procedure for each state, incorporating human rights protections, legal
processes, and the apparatuses and actions for criminal investigations.202
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Most major countries have created national legislation related to
cybercrime extradition and have provided for legal assistance concerning other
nations in cases where these nations call for assistance in matters that extend
across borders. Almost all countries in Europe have reported that such legislation
exists within their countries. The United Kingdom was the first country to create
national legislation in the subject of cybercrime. The legislation in question was
“The Computer Misuse Act of 1990,” which contained punishments for computerrelated crimes.203 Many nations soon followed suit. China promulgated the
“Computer Information Network and Internet Security Protection and
Management Regulations, 1997” to police internet activities. However, the
Chinese legislation dealt mainly with national security within China instead of the
deterrence of cybercrime. Chinese President Xi Jingping connected
cybersecurity with national security as well as with the country’s growth,
remarking that “there is no national security without cybersecurity, and no
modernization without informatization.”204 In China, internet security has been a
focal point of public opinion and government policy. In a survey conducted by the
Chinese publication Global Times, 98.1 percent of individuals support the
government’s initiative of creating specialized laws to protect internet security. 205
To this day, the U.S. has the widest range of legal conditions regarding

203

Great Britain. Computer Misuse Act 1990: Elizabeth II. 1990. Chapter 18. London: H.M.S.O.,
1990. Print.
204 Cindy. "China Wants Party's Voice "Strongest in Cyberspace" - China Digital Times (CDT)."
China Digital Times (CDT). 08 Jan. 2016. Web. 02 May 2016.
205 Rudolph, Josh. "Documents Show How Weibo Filters Sensitive News - China Digital Times
(CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). March 03, 2016. Accessed May 01, 2016.
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/03/documents-show-how-weibo-filters-sensitive-news/.

136

cybercrime, incorporating provisions concerning violations, investigation, as well
as punishment.
There are also international coalitions and groups that have legislation
pertaining to the subject. The European Commission, the executive board that
administers the European Union, announced in 1995 a data protection
directive.206 It concentrated on the online security of personal data. The directive
was amended again in 2011 to combat new technology and circumstances.
NATO, the North America Treaty Organization, created cyber-defense
responsibilities for its controlled websites by establishing the NATO Computer
Incident Response Capability (NCIRC).
Along the same lines, the Council of Europe implemented significant
proposals to its member states regarding criminal procedural law on cybercrime
in 1995. The group’s recommendations formed the basis of the Convention on
Cybercrime on 2001. The international treaty contained policies to ease the
gathering of evidence, as well as the prosecution and punishment of criminals,
for the nations involved. By agreeing to the treaty, the country agreed to create a
minimum set of national laws to mirror the treaty’s laws on particular computerbased crimes.
More modernly, because of the hacking efforts of the US actors on China
and the efforts of Chinese hackers on US systems, the United States and
Chinese governments have made some serious breakthroughs in international
cooperation to combat cybercrime. According to New York Times writer David E.
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Sanger, “The United States and China are negotiating what could become the
first arms control accord for cyberspace, embracing a commitment by each
country that it will not be the first to use cyberweapons to cripple the other’s
critical infrastructure during peacetime.” To counter Sanger’s statement about the
international accord, People’s Daily writer Liu Xin proclaimed that the agreement
“is expected to halt all disputes” and “could serve as a role model for other
countries”.207 From both sides, there is definitely mutual cooperation. There are
other countries with incredible cyber-capabilities like Russia that would be the
next logical addition to any international accords, like for two nations with
significant cyber-power to come together and form even a shaky alliance is a
step in the right direction.
The cyberwarfare capabilities of the three nations is indeed moving into
the forefront of the minds of everyday citizens, as well as in popular culture. The
novel Ghost Fleet by Singer and Cole, portrays the increasing fears of cyberattacks and cyber warfare on a global scale. Chinese cyber warfare lays the
groundwork for war in the narrative on the story. They prey on real fears of today
in an attempt to predict tomorrow. For example, American equipment and
systems manufactured in China are infiltrated without the knowledge of the
American public. Hackers are active, public, and a military force in China as well,
even well equipped with the fictitious tools needed to create an army of red
hackers as the unthinking arm of the government. The authors romanticize the
topic making it very popular, especially in the cyber-defense circles. It expresses
207

Wade, Samuel. "Xi Pledges Cooperation vs. Hacking as Sanctions Loom - China Digital Times
(CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). September 22, 2015. Accessed May 02, 2016.
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/09/hacking-sanctions-threat-hangs-over-xis-u-s-visit/.

138

the anxiety of the American public, and what makes it even more significant is
that it is not entirely wrong.
Some of the themes of the novel are very much a reality. In 2012
Microsoft researchers found that computers that had never before turned on
were already compromised by malware.208 In 2015, Lenovo, one of the world’s
biggest computer manufacturers, was found selling systems with malware and
other malicious software pre-installed. The software was named the “Superfish
Malware”, and it was found with the ability to analyze the users internet usage in
an attempt to interject advertisements into the computers web browser. 209
Behind President Xi Jingping, China has indeed made progress in halting
the efforts of hackers in the mainland. In 2014, the Cyberspace Administration of
China (CAC) was founded. It is now the group responsible for the governance of
the internet within the PRC. During the group’s first meeting, President Xi
stressed that the lack of network security throughout the country is indeed
negatively affecting the whole. According to Bill Hagestad, in his book Chinese
Cyber Crime, the President called for “unified planning, unified deployment,
unified effort, and unified implementation.”210 The President offered this, “in
today’s world, the ever-changing information technology revolution of the
international political, economic, cultural, social, military and other areas of
development had a profound impact… China is in this tide, it affected more and
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more… we must also realize that we are relatively backward in terms of
innovation.”211 It are instances like this that makes Ghost Fleet such a strong
portrayal. It takes subjects that strike fear in the present, and magnify them in the
context of war.
The current landscape of cybercrime legislation involves ongoing legal
reform, yet it is fairly new in terms of international law. States are increasingly
aware that it requires legal responses across multiple platforms and across
borders. These have a tendency to include criminal, civil, and administrative
laws. Traditional laws can sometimes provide nations with the ability to prosecute
cybercrime cases, but these cases usually have both the target and attacker
within the country’s borders and do not require the aid of investigation of other
nations. Although cybercrime law does date back several decades, it has only
been in the past decade that cybercrime has become a significant global issue.
In order to combat such a dynamic field and the ever-changing nature of
computer-based concepts, the introduction of shared definitions and agreement
on specific offenses have been created in an attempt to prosecute new crimes.
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April 8, 2008. Accessed October 19, 2015.
http://www.lexpress.fr/info/quotidien/actu.asp?id=469562
Laliberte, Andre, and Marc Lanteigne. The Chinese Party-state in the 21st
Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy. London:
Routledge, 2008.
Lau, Hon. "The Truth Behind the Shady RAT." Symantec Security Response.
August 4, 2011. Accessed March 30, 2016.
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/truth-behind-shady-rat
Lewis, Leo. “China’s Blue Army of 30 computer experts could deploy cyber
warfare on foreign powers,” The Australian. May 27, 2011. Accessed
February 21, 2016.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/technology/chinas-blue-armycould-conduct-cyber-warfare-on-foreign-powers/story-e6frgakx1226064132826
Li Zi, “The Chinese Hacker Evolution,” People in Focus Weekly, March 10, 2005.
Accessed February 21, 2016.
http://net.chinabyte.com/386/1920386.shtml
Liang, Guo, and Markle Corporation. "Surveying Internet Usage and Its Impact in
Seven Chinese Cities." Center for Social Development Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences. 2007. Accessed January 17, 2016.
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/16013
Long San, “Let’s look back on the days of the Red Hacker Alliance,” Juntuan.
October 24, 2005. Accessed November 17, 2005.
http://www.juntuan.cn/user1/2334/archives/2005/9612.shtml

147

Lynden, Jacki. "In China, Avoiding The 'Great Firewall' Internet Censors." NPR.
September 7, 2013. Accessed April 11, 2016.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=220106496
MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Chinese Protest BBS Crackdown." RConversation. March
20, 2005. Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2005/03/chinese_protest.htm
l
Makortoff, Kayleena. "Anonymous to Fight IS, Bigotry after Brussels." CNBC.
March 24, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2016.
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/24/after-brussels-anonymous-to-tackle-isisand-bigotry.html
Mandiant Inc. APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units. Rep. N.p.:
Mandiant, 2014. Print.
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.http://intelrepo
rt.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
Marcus, Jonathan. "China Condemns Hacking Report by US Firm Mandiant"
BBC News. February 20, 2013. Accessed October 31, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21515259
Martin, Patrick. "US Adopts Aggressive Anti-China Posture in Aftermath of Spy
Plane Crisis." World Socialist Web Site. April 15, 2001. Accessed
December 25, 2015. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/04/china15.html
"Masters of the Cyber-universe." The Economist. April 6, 2013. December 13,
2015. http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574636-chinasstate-sponsored-hackers-are-ubiquitousand-totally-unabashed-masters
McAffee Securities. Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime.
Report. Santa Clara: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014.
Losses: Estimating
McMillan, Robert. "As Hacking Hits Home, China Strengthens Cyber Laws."
PCWorld. May 11, 2009. Accessed March 18, 2016.
Mimoso, Michael. "APT Gang Branches Out to Medical Espionage in Community
Health Breach." Threatpost The First Stop for Security News. August 19,
2014. November 17, 2015. https://threatpost.com/apt-gang-branches-outto-medical-espionage-in-community-health-breach/107828/
Mulvenon, James. and Tyroler-Cooper, Rebecca Samm “China’s Defense
Industry on the Path to Reform” U.S.-China Economic and Security
148

Review Commission, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009)
dtic.mil/dtic/tr/.../u2/a523026.pdf
Naone, Erica. "Google Reveals Chinese Espionage Efforts." MIT Technology
Review. January 13, 2010. Accessed December 17, 2015.
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/417087/google-reveals-chineseespionage-efforts/
Nuttall, Chris. "Chinese Protesters Attack Indonesia through Net." BBC News.
August 19, 1998. Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/154079.stm
Orlowski, Andrew. "Michael Hauben, Netizen, Dies.” The Register. June 30,
2001. Web. March 28, 2016.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/06/30/michael_hauben_netizen_dies/
Paganini, Pierluigi. "Wekby APT Attacks Leverage Hacking Team Exploits."
Security Affairs. July 11, 2015. Accessed May 03, 2016.
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/38500/cyber-crime/wekby-apt-htexploits.html.
Pan, Philip P. "Chinese Crack Down On Student Web Sites." The Washington
Post. March 24, 2005. Accessed September 28, 2015.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61334-2005Mar23.html
Pidathala, Vinay, Zheng Bu, Thoufique Haq, and Darien Kindlund. "Operation
Beebus." FireEye. February 1, 2013. Accessed December 25, 2015.
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/operationbeebus.html
"Race to the Bottom": Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship."
Human Rights Watch 18, no. 8 (August 2006). Accessed April 11, 2016.
"Re-Defining Cyberspace - China Digital Times (CDT)." China Digital Times
(CDT). October 09, 2015. Accessed May 01, 2016.
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/10/re-defining-cyberspace/.
Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's
Japan Policy. New York: Columbia UP, 2012. 126.
Robel, Dan. International Cybercrime Treaty: Looking Beyond Ratification. SANS
Institute. 2006. Accessed March 28, 2016.
https://www.sans.org/.../international-cybercrime-treaty-rat
Rogin, Josh. "NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the greatest transfer of wealth
in history." Foreign Policy. July 9, 2012. Accessed February 21, 2016.
149

http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief-cybercrime-constitutes-thegreatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/
Rudolph, Josh. "China Dismisses U.S. Cyber-Spying Charges - China Digital
Times (CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). May 19, 2014. Accessed May
01, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/05/chinese-govt-netizensangry-u-s-cyber-spying-charges/.
Rudolph, Josh. "China Reveals Its Cyberwar Secrets." China Digital Times
(CDT). March 19, 2015. Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/china-reveals-its-cyberwar-secrets/
Rudolph, Josh. "Documents Show How Weibo Filters Sensitive News - China
Digital Times (CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). March 03, 2016.
Accessed May 01, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/03/documentsshow-how-weibo-filters-sensitive-news/.
Seabrook, John. "Network Insecurity." The New Yorker. 20 May 20, 2013.
Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/20/network-insecurity
Sinkkonen, Elina. "Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among
Chinese University Students." The China Quarterly 216 (2013): 1045-063.
Web.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid
=9113316&fileId=S0305741013001094
“Speech at opening of the first Presidential Cadet Academy,” September 1, 2010,
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transctipts/865.
Stanek, Becca. "How Did Anonymous Start? The History Of The Mysterious
"Hacktivist" Group Began Quite Some Time Ago." Bustle. February 20,
2015. Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.bustle.com/articles/65444how-did-anonymous-start-the-history-of-the-mysterious-hacktivist-groupbegan-quite-some-time-ago
Sterbenz, Christina. "China Banned The Term '50 Cents' To Stop Discussion Of
An Orwellian Propaganda Program." Business Insider. October 17, 2014.
Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-50-centparty-2014-10
Stewert, Joe. "Operation Aurora: Clues in the Code." Dell SecureWorks. January
19, 2010. Accessed Setpember 30, 2015.
https://www.secureworks.com/blog/research-20913

150

Summers, Timothy C. "Here's What Chinese Hackers Really Want."
MarketWatch. October 1, 2015. Accessed February 14, 2016.
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-what-chinese-hackers-reallywant-2015-10-01
“Taiwan: Hacker Working for PRC Firm Arrested,” Taipei Times. June 26, 2002.
Accessed December 21, 2015.
“The Ever-Changing Red Hacker Sharp Winner,” Interview of Sharp Winner by
China Educational Television Satellite Channel (CETV-SD), September
13, 2005. Accessed January 14, 2016
http://forum.gd.sina.com.cn/cgibin/viewone.cgi?gid=51&fid=1359&itemid=
8191
"The Great Chinese BBS Crackdown." EastSouthWestNorth. Accessed January
14, 2016. http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050322_2.htm
“The Growth of the Chinese Computer Hacker,” KKER Union of China.
November 20, 2004. Accessed March 13, 2016.
http://www.kker.cn/book/list.asp?id=1264
Thornburgh, Nathan. "Inside the Chinese Hack Attack." Time. August 25, 2005.
Accessed September 30, 2016.
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1098371,00.html
Tweed, David. "U.S.-China Hacking Deal Seen on Civilian, Not Company Hits."
Bloomberg.com. September 22, 2015. Accessed December 17, 2015.
Uzunovic, Agan. “Chinese Hackers.” E-mail interview by author. April 5, 2016.
United Nation General Assemby. Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information
Technologies: Resolution. New York: UN, 2001. Print.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Proliferation
Practices, and the Development of its Cyber and Space Warfare
Capabilities,” May 2008 Accessed February 21, 2016.
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/transcripts/08_05_20_trans/0
8_05_20_trans.pdf
Vardi, Nathan. “Chinese Takeout,” Forbes. July 25, 2005. Accessed October 13,
2015. http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0725/054.html
Venable, David. “Chinese Hackers.” E-mail interview by author. April 13, 2016.
Ventre, Daniel. Chinese Cybersecurity and Defense. London: ISTE, 2014. Print.

151

Vijayan, Jaikumarcc. "Chinese Hackers Master the Art of Lying in Wait."
Computerworld. May 8, 2013. Accessed March 28, 2016.
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2497171/cyberwarfare/chinesehackers-master-the-art-of-lying-in-wait.html
Wade, Samuel. "Chinese Cyberchiefs Preach Internet Sovereignty in Moscow China Digital Times (CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). April 27, 2016.
Accessed May 01, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/04/chinesecyberchiefs-preach-internet-sovereignty-moscow/.
Wade, Samuel. "Xi Pledges Cooperation vs. Hacking as Sanctions Loom - China
Digital Times (CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). September 22, 2015.
Accessed May 02, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/09/hackingsanctions-threat-hangs-over-xis-u-s-visit/.
Walton, Greg. China's Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of
Surveillance Technology in the People's Republic of China. Montréal:
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